{"id":3610,"date":"2026-05-10T20:16:13","date_gmt":"2026-05-10T18:16:13","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/johan-callewaert.eu\/?p=3610"},"modified":"2026-05-11T10:05:59","modified_gmt":"2026-05-11T08:05:59","slug":"what-is-a-complete-system-of-legal-remedies-and-procedures-judgment-of-the-cjeu-in-mincu-patrascu-brancusi-v-eppo","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/johan-callewaert.eu\/de\/what-is-a-complete-system-of-legal-remedies-and-procedures-judgment-of-the-cjeu-in-mincu-patrascu-brancusi-v-eppo\/","title":{"rendered":"What is a complete system of legal remedies and procedures? Judgment of the CJEU in Mincu P\u0103tra\u0219cu Br\u00e2ncu\u0219i v. EPPO"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

After G.K. and Others<\/a><\/em> and EPPO (judicial review of procedural acts)<\/a><\/em>, Mincu P\u0103tra\u0219cu Br\u00e2ncu\u0219i v EPPO<\/em><\/a> (C-328\/24 P, 16.4.2026) is another case in which the CJEU clarified the particular structure of the European Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office<\/strong> (EPPO), as provided by Regulation 2017\/1939 implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office (\u201cthe Regulation\u201d).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The importance of this case lies in the fact that it confirms, through detailed reasoning, the key role played by national courts<\/strong> in ensuring an effective judicial review of procedural acts by the EPPO<\/strong> which produce legal effects vis-\u00e0-vis third parties.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the present case, the appellant challenged Article 42(1) of the Regulation<\/strong>, the first sentence of which provides that procedural acts of the EPPO that are intended to produce legal effects vis-\u00e0-vis third parties shall be subject to review by the competent national courts<\/strong> in accordance with the requirements and procedures laid down by national law<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The appellant had brought an action before the General Court<\/strong> against a decision by the EPPO referring his case to trial. The General Court dismissed the action on the ground that, having regard to Article 42(1) of the Regulation, it lacked jurisdiction<\/strong> to hear and determine it. Before the CJEU, the appellant challenged that dismissal. He contested Article 42(1), arguing that denying the General Court jurisdiction over such EPPO acts violated his right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial, as guaranteed by Article 47 of the EU-Charter.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The CJEU dismissed the appeal. After emphasizing that Article 86(3) TFEU expressly allows the EU legislature to determine the rules applicable to the judicial review of procedural measures taken by the EPPO, it noted the substantial level of integration of the EPPO within the Member States\u2019 systems of criminal procedure<\/strong> (\u00a7 70). Because the legal effects of EPPO acts were largely determined by national law, national courts were „best suited“<\/strong> to carry out judicial review of these procedural acts (\u00a7 82). Article 42 thus established a specialized system in which national courts review procedural acts, while EU courts retain exclusive jurisdiction over administrative decisions, data protection issues, and decisions to dismiss a case (where challenged on EU law grounds).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Accordingly, Article 42(1) was held to be fully consistent with the complete system of legal remedies and procedures designed to ensure judicial review of the legality of EU acts<\/strong>, as established by the TFEU (\u00a7 100). In particular, this provision was found to respect the right to effective judicial protection<\/strong> guaranteed by Article 47 of the EU-Charter<\/strong>, since it ensured the procedural fairness<\/strong> and the rights of the defence<\/strong> of persons affected by the procedural acts of the EPPO (\u00a7 98).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

*              *              *<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Having regard to the hybrid structure of the EPPO system, the repeated reference by the CJEU to the \u201ccomplete system of legal remedies and procedures<\/strong> designed to ensure judicial review of the legality of EU acts\u201d (\u00a7\u00a7 66 and 100) would appear to take on a special significance. In the highly specific context of hybrid EU institutions<\/strong> which rely extensively on national institutions applying national law, one may legitimately question <\/strong>whether the system of judicial protection concerning EPPO acts, as described by the CJEU, is in fact as complete as the CJEU suggests<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This question arises because the CJEU\u2019s description entirely omits the impact of the European Convention on Human Rights<\/strong> on domestic judges applying their own national law by virtue of Article 42 of the Regulation, thereby implicitly suggesting that the completeness of judicial protection in this field results solely from the interaction between national law and EU law<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The reality, however, is different. As the CJEU itself emphasizes, the reason national courts have jurisdiction over the procedural acts covered by Article 42(1) of the Regulation lies in the substantial level of integration of the EPPO within the Member States\u2019 systems of criminal procedure<\/strong> (\u00a7 70). In practice, national courts<\/strong> are likely to be involved far more frequently than EU courts in litigation concerning EPPO acts, since Article 42(1) of the Regulation grants them exclusive jurisdiction<\/strong> over all procedural acts of the EPPO affecting persons directly targeted by those acts. As expressly provided by Article 42(1), their review is to be conducted in accordance with the requirements and procedures laid down by national law<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Procedural fairness<\/strong> and the rights of the defence<\/strong> can be expected to play a central role in this type of litigation (\u00a7 98). Yet, at national level, these matters are to a very large extent governed by the Convention<\/strong>, in particular Article 6<\/strong> thereof, which constitutes a mandatory minimum level of protection<\/strong> that Member States remain free to enhance, including in response to EU law requirements.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

First, national judges remain bound by the Convention<\/strong> when applying EU law and are therefore required to interpret and apply EU law consistently with the Convention (see, among others, Bivolaru and Moldovan v. France<\/a><\/em>, \u00a7 103). Pending confirmation by the ECtHR, there is no reason why this would be any different when they apply their own national law pursuant to Article 42(1) of the Regulation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Secondly, the Strasbourg case-law<\/strong> concerning the criminal limb of Article 6 of the Convention, developed over more than seventy years, is clearly far more extensive and detailed<\/strong> than the case-law so far developed by the CJEU on the basis of EU law, including Article 47 of the EU Charter and the Directives on procedural rights in criminal proceedings. For an overview of that case-law, see the Guide on Article 6 (criminal limb)<\/em><\/a> by the Registry of the ECtHR.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is therefore unsurprising that the CJEU relies extensively on Strasbourg case-law<\/strong> when interpreting these Directives and seeking to fill their numerous lacunae. Examples include VB II<\/em><\/a>, Stachev<\/em><\/a>, K.B. and F.S.<\/em><\/a>, Politseyski organ pri 02 RU SDVR<\/em><\/a>, HYA and Others<\/em><\/a>, HN and DD<\/em><\/a>, Spetsializirana prokuratura<\/em><\/a>, IS<\/em><\/a> and the Opinion of Advocate General \u0106apeta in European Commission v. Hungary<\/em><\/a> and European Commission v. Czech Republic<\/em><\/a>). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Thirdly, such reliance on the Convention is mandated by Article 52(3) of the EU-Charter<\/strong>, which imposes the Convention minimum standard across EU law, and by the non-regression clauses<\/strong> contained in those Directives..<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Accordingly, the detailed minimum standards resulting from Strasbourg case-law in the field of criminal proceedings constitute an essential component of the \u201ccomplete\u201d protection of fundamental rights<\/strong> ensured at national level in respect of procedural acts of the EPPO<\/strong> which, however, the CJEU attributes solely to Articles 47 and 48 of the EU-Charter<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To disregard the contribution of the Convention<\/strong> in the context of hybrid institutions \u2014 where that contribution is not only indirectly required under EU law<\/strong> but is also necessary because of the lacunae of EU law<\/strong> in this field \u2014 is therefore even more problematic than elsewhere. More than in any other context, hybrid institutions demonstrate that the effects of EU law cannot adequately be understood in isolation from those of the Convention.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In other words, if the Convention is omitted<\/strong> from the description of the system of judicial protection, that system can be regarded as \u201ccomplete\u201d only in a very formal sense<\/strong> and from the perspective of EU law alone. From a substantive and holistic domestic perspective<\/strong>, however, it remains incomplete<\/strong>, thereby creating a risk of misunderstanding<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

*              *              *<\/p>\n\n\n\n

That said, as long as the EU will not have acceded to the Convention (on this accession, see The European Commission requests an Opinion by the CJEU<\/a><\/em>), the protection afforded by the Convention<\/strong> will itself remain incomplete <\/strong>with regard to hybrid institutions involving EU officials operating within a domestic legal context.<\/strong> As noted in a previous post concerning W.S. and Others v. Frontex<\/em><\/a>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

From a Convention perspective, these hybrid constructions operating within the territory and jurisdiction of the Member States represent a new situation. It is no longer a Bosphorus-type scenario in which national authorities are the sole bodies responsible for applying EU law and thereby ensuring the full application of the Convention to all actions undertaken by them, even when those actions are based on EU law. Instead, full coverage by the Convention is being replaced by a \u201cpatchwork coverage\u201d, with gaps in the Convention\u2019s applicability emerging where actions within the jurisdiction of the Member States are carried out by EU entities or officers acting on behalf of the EU itself and therefore not subject to the Convention.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

This marks the end of the complete Convention protection<\/strong> as described by the ECtHR in the following terms:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cArticle 1 of the Convention requires the High Contracting Parties to \u201csecure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in \u2026 [the] Convention\u201d. Article 1 makes no distinction as to the type of rule or measure concerned, and does not exclude any part of the member States\u2019 \u201cjurisdiction\u201d from scrutiny under the Convention.\u201d <\/em>(among many others: Matthews v. the United Kingdom<\/a><\/em>, \u00a7 29). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

These new gaps in the Convention protection<\/strong> make the case for accession by the EU to the Convention<\/strong> even more compelling (see Accession of the EU to the ECHR: a logical response to the optionality of the ECHR in EU Law<\/em><\/a>, p. 11 et seq.).<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

After G.K. and Others and EPPO (judicial review of procedural acts), Mincu P\u0103tra\u0219cu Br\u00e2ncu\u0219i v EPPO (C-328\/24 P, 16.4.2026) is another case in which the CJEU clarified the particular structure of the European Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office (EPPO), as provided by Regulation 2017\/1939 implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office (\u201cthe […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[23,19],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3610","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-court-of-justice-of-the-eu","category-recent-case-law"],"translation":{"provider":"WPGlobus","version":"3.0.2","language":"de","enabled_languages":["en","de","fr"],"languages":{"en":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":false},"de":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false},"fr":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false}}},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/johan-callewaert.eu\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3610","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/johan-callewaert.eu\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/johan-callewaert.eu\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/johan-callewaert.eu\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/johan-callewaert.eu\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3610"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/johan-callewaert.eu\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3610\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3616,"href":"https:\/\/johan-callewaert.eu\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3610\/revisions\/3616"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/johan-callewaert.eu\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3610"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/johan-callewaert.eu\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3610"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/johan-callewaert.eu\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3610"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}