{"id":3265,"date":"2025-01-21T19:30:18","date_gmt":"2025-01-21T18:30:18","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/johan-callewaert.eu\/?p=3265"},"modified":"2025-12-04T12:48:24","modified_gmt":"2025-12-04T11:48:24","slug":"accession-of-the-european-union-to-the-european-convention-on-human-rights-a-logical-response-to-the-optionality-of-the-european-convention-on-human-rights-in-eu-law","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/johan-callewaert.eu\/fr\/accession-of-the-european-union-to-the-european-convention-on-human-rights-a-logical-response-to-the-optionality-of-the-european-convention-on-human-rights-in-eu-law\/","title":{"rendered":"Accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights: a logical response to the optionality of the European Convention on Human Rights in EU Law"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

This paper is the English translation of an article with the title: “L\u2019adh\u00e9sion de l\u2019Union europ\u00e9enne \u00e0 la Convention europ\u00e9enne des droits de l\u2019homme : une r\u00e9ponse logique \u00e0 l\u2019optionalit\u00e9 de la Convention europ\u00e9enne des droits de l\u2019homme en droit de l\u2019Union europ\u00e9enne”, published in the Revue trimestrielle des droits de l’homme<\/em>, 2025, p. 9, and also attached below.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The main findings of this paper can be summed up as follows:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The benchmark function<\/strong> formally conferred on the European Convention on Human Rights by the Union legislature is rendered optional <\/strong>in the practice of Union law. As a result, the minimum level of protection which the Convention ensures in the Member States and which the EU legislature sought to extend to Union law is more often than not ignored, in favour of a more frequent use of the Convention as a mere “toolbox”<\/strong>, i.e. as a source of inspiration or non-binding interpretation. This optionality of the Convention<\/strong> leads to significant reductions in protection<\/strong>, introduces double standards<\/strong> into procedures involving hybrid structures and causes conflicts of loyalty for national judges<\/strong> who are both Union and Convention judges. The resulting dysfunctions are a source of fragmentation<\/strong> and weaken European fundamental rights. They make it imperative for the EU to accede to the Convention.<\/p>\n\n\n\n