{"id":3434,"date":"2025-10-12T21:16:23","date_gmt":"2025-10-12T19:16:23","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/johan-callewaert.eu\/?p=3434"},"modified":"2026-01-02T20:13:35","modified_gmt":"2026-01-02T19:13:35","slug":"in-search-of-a-missing-holistic-approach-judgment-of-the-cjeu-in-nuratau","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/johan-callewaert.eu\/fr\/in-search-of-a-missing-holistic-approach-judgment-of-the-cjeu-in-nuratau\/","title":{"rendered":"In search of a missing holistic approach: judgment of the CJEU in Nuratau"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

In the case of Nuratau<\/a><\/em> (5.6.2025, C-349\/24), the CJEU ruled on the interpretation of Article 3 of the Qualification Directive<\/strong> (2011\/95), which allows EU Member States to adopt more favourable standards<\/strong> for granting international protection<\/strong>, provided they are compatible with the Directive. \u200b The case involved A.B., a third-country national in the Czech Republic, whose application for international protection was rejected three times by the Ministry of the Interior. \u200b A.B. argued that his removal to his country of origin would violate his right to private life<\/strong> due to the severing of his ties with the Czech Republic. \u200b<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The CJEU clarified that subsidiary protection under the Qualification Directive is intended to address risks of serious harm in the applicant’s country of origin<\/strong>, such as the death penalty, torture, or threats due to violence. \u200b It does not cover risks related to the applicant’s private life in the Member State examining the application<\/strong>. \u200b Therefore, national legislation granting subsidiary protection based on the severing of ties with the host Member State is not within the scope of the Directive and cannot be considered a “more favourable standard” under Article 3. \u200b Thus, this provision does not allow national legislation to grant subsidiary protection based solely on the risk of breaching the applicant’s right to private life.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, the CJEU noted that Member States are free to grant residence permits<\/strong> or protection on humanitarian grounds<\/strong> under their national laws<\/strong> for reasons unrelated to the applicant’s country of origin, as long as such protection is distinct from the refugee or subsidiary protection status under the Qualification Directive. \u200b Additionally, the Court emphasized that any return decision or removal order made under the Return Directive<\/strong> (2008\/115) must respect the fundamental rights of the individual, including the right to private life, as guaranteed by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights<\/strong>. Consequently, \u200ba return decision or a removal order cannot be adopted if it infringes the right to respect for the private life of the third-country national concerned.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

*              *              *<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This judgment not only highlights the limits of EU law<\/strong> in safeguarding the right to private life<\/strong> within the framework of international protection<\/strong>, it also is a striking example of how the CJEU closes itself off to a holistic approach<\/strong>, even in cases where it would be most needed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

While the CJEU reaffirmed that Member States may adopt more favourable standards<\/strong> under Article 3 of the Qualification Directive, it ruled that such discretion cannot extend to granting subsidiary protection solely on the basis of a risk to private life<\/strong> arising from the severance of personal ties with the host Member State. At the same time, it left open the possibility for Member States to grant residence on humanitarian grounds<\/strong> under national law.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In this domestic context, the CJEU referred to the EU Charter. Mindful of Article 51(1)<\/strong> of that Charter, which limits the latter\u2019s scope to that of EU law, the CJEU established the connection between the applicant\u2019s circumstances and EU law through a possible application of the Return Directive<\/strong>, giving rise to a decision to return or remove the third-country national.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

At this juncture, two important aspects appear to have been overlooked by the CJEU. First, when national authorities, as suggested by the CJEU, rely on domestic law to determine whether a third-country national should be permitted to reside in the country<\/strong>, they are unlikely to base their assessment on the Return Directive, whose very purpose is to facilitate removal rather than residence. Secondly, Article 8<\/strong> of the Convention remains applicable in any event<\/strong>, even where the Return Directive ultimately governs the case.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This is because under the Convention, domestic courts confronted with a claim that deportation would result in a serious interference with private or family life<\/strong> are required<\/strong> – regardless of whether EU law applies – to assess the claim in light of Article 8. The ECtHR has developed a rich and nuanced body of case law<\/strong> setting out the criteria for such assessments (see the Guide on Article 8 of the Convention<\/a><\/em>, at \u00a7\u00a7 328-330)).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Thus, seen from a broader human rights perspective, Nuratau <\/em>indirectly highlights the importance of the Convention as a complementary, <\/strong>or indeed as the primary safeguard<\/strong> in a context like the present one. While the Convention does not confer any right to asylum<\/strong> or international protection (N.D. and N.T. v. Spain<\/a>, <\/em>\u00a7 188), its Article 8 does operate to preclude deportation<\/strong> where such deportation would entail a disproportionate interference<\/strong> with the individual\u2019s private or family life<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This principle also finds resonance within EU law through Article 52(3) of the EU-Charter<\/strong>, which provides that rights in the EU-Charter corresponding to those in the Convention must be interpreted consistently<\/strong> with the latter. Thus, even in the context of the Return Directive, the substantive protection offered by Article 8 of the Convention ought to inform the interpretation and application of EU law.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

That said, the Convention framework and the EU legal order do not coincide entirely<\/strong>. Article 8 of the Convention, while capable of preventing removal<\/strong>, does not generate the broader entitlements attached to EU subsidiary protection<\/strong> – such as a residence permit, access to employment, education, or social welfare. Where the Qualification Directive does not apply, these matters remain governed by national law<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The outcome is a fragmented landscape<\/strong> in which the level and nature of protection depend on whether the case falls within the scope of EU secondary legislation<\/strong> or instead under the residual guarantees of the Convention<\/strong>. One can only regret the complete silence of the CJEU<\/strong> on the relevance and impact of Article 8<\/strong> of the Convention in this context.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

*              *              *<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Nuratau <\/em>therefore illustrates, with particular clarity, the complex interaction<\/strong> between EU law, national humanitarian discretion, and the Convention system. It also exposes the CJEU\u2019s reluctance<\/strong> to engage with the broader legal landscape<\/strong>: despite the Convention\u2019s clear relevance in cases such as the present one, the CJEU refrains from acknowledging it as part of the interpretative framework. In doing so, it misses one more opportunity to promote a more integrated approach<\/strong> to fundamental rights protection in Europe – one that would provide clearer guidance<\/strong> to national courts faced with such hybrid cases.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This reluctance is all the more worrying given that there are examples to the contrary<\/strong>. One of them is Dereci and Others<\/a>, <\/em>which concerned an issue not too remote from the issue at stake in Nuratau<\/em>: the right of residence of third country nationals<\/strong> who sought to join their European Union citizen family members. In this case, a Grand Chamber of the CJEU explicitly addressed the interplay between EU law and the Convention<\/strong> in the following way:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cIn the present case, if the referring court considers, in the light of the circumstances of the disputes in the main proceedings, that the situation of the applicants in the main proceedings is covered by European Union law, it must examine whether the refusal of their right of residence undermines the right to respect for private and family life provided for in Article 7 of the Charter. On the other hand, if it takes the view that that situation is not covered by European Union law, it must undertake that examination in the light of Article 8(1) of the ECHR. All the Member States are, after all, parties to the ECHR which enshrines the right to respect for private and family life in Article 8.\u201d <\/em>(\u00a7\u00a7 72-73)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In light of this statement, by disregarding the possibility of a more holistic approach<\/strong> and presenting only a limited, fragmented view<\/strong> of the fundamental rights landscape as it exists in practice, Nuratau<\/em> represents a regrettable step back in the CJEU\u2019s role<\/strong> in assisting domestic courts and citizens in navigating Europe\u2019s complex and fragmented framework of fundamental rights<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Be that as it may, the key takeaway for domestic judges and prosecutors is that Article 8 of the Convention invariably applies<\/strong> to claims by third-country nationals who allege a risk of violation <\/strong>of their right to private or family life<\/strong> in the event of deportation, regardless of whether EU law is applicable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

In the case of Nuratau (5.6.2025, C-349\/24), the CJEU ruled on the interpretation of Article 3 of the Qualification Directive (2011\/95), which allows EU Member States to adopt more favourable standards for granting international protection, provided they are compatible with the Directive. \u200b The case involved A.B., a third-country national in the Czech Republic, whose […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[23,19],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3434","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-court-of-justice-of-the-eu","category-recent-case-law"],"translation":{"provider":"WPGlobus","version":"3.0.2","language":"fr","enabled_languages":["en","de","fr"],"languages":{"en":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":false},"de":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false},"fr":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false}}},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/johan-callewaert.eu\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3434","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/johan-callewaert.eu\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/johan-callewaert.eu\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/johan-callewaert.eu\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/johan-callewaert.eu\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3434"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/johan-callewaert.eu\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3434\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3526,"href":"https:\/\/johan-callewaert.eu\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3434\/revisions\/3526"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/johan-callewaert.eu\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3434"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/johan-callewaert.eu\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3434"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/johan-callewaert.eu\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3434"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}