The facts
In its Grand Chamber judgment of 3 November 2026 in the Tagu case (C-583/24), the CJEU was confronted with a rather striking case concerning the execution of a European Arrest Warrant (EAW).
DZ had been sentenced in Romania to seven years‘ imprisonment for importing three grams of cannabis and four MDMA pills into the country, together with his wife. Under Romanian law, the importation of drugs classified as both ‚risk‘ and ‚high-risk‘ drugs attracts a mandatory minimum sentence of seven years. The referring Dutch court pointed out that, for comparable conduct involving up to 10 grams of such drugs, the applicable penalty in the Netherlands would be between one and three weeks‘ imprisonment.
DZ opposed his surrender to Romania, arguing that the sentence imposed on him was manifestly disproportionate and therefore contrary to Article 49(3) of the EU-Charter of Fundamental Rights, which provides that the severity of penalties must not be disproportionate to the criminal offence.
The question was whether the Dutch executing judicial authority could refuse to execute the EAW on that ground.
The answer of the CJEU is that it cannot, because the relevant Romanian legislation does not give rise to systemic or generalised deficiencies as regards compliance with Article 49(3) of the EU-Charter. The practical consequence is that, under EU law, DZ must now be transferred to Romania to serve his seven-year prison sentence.
Observations
Legislation says it all?
As usual in its EAW case-law, the CJEU insists on the fundamental importance of the principles of mutual trust and mutual recognition for the establishment and maintenance of the EU’s area of freedom, security and justice.
According to the CJEU’s well-known methodology, these principles require that any assessment of whether the execution of an EAW entails a risk of infringement of the fundamental rights of the person concerned must be done in two steps, through a general followed by an individual test.
In a first step,the executing judicial authority must find out about the existence, in the issuing Member State, of systemic or generalised deficiencies which, in case of transfer, would entail a real risk of infringement of the fundamental right at issue. Only if such deficiencies have been established is the executing authority allowed to examine to what extent they are liable to affect the person concerned, i.e. whether, having regard to that person’s individual situation, there are substantial grounds for believing that surrender will expose that person to a real risk of infringement of his or her fundamental rights. These two steps must remain separate and cannot overlap (§§ 62–66).
Applying the first step itself, the CJEU then proceeds to examine whether the Romanian legal system as such is characterised by systemic or generalised deficiencies which entail a risk of infringement of Article 49(3) of the Charter.
According to the CJEU, such a risk can only be established, for the purposes of refusing transfer, where the legislation or judicial practice of the issuing Member State constitutes a manifest and serious breach of the principle of proportionality, and where no effective judicial remedy exists in that Member State to redress that breach (§ 82).
This will be the case if the legislation of the Member State concerned either provides or imposes custodial sentences which are so disproportionate as to be equivalent to inhuman or degrading punishment within the meaning of Article 4 of the EU-Charter, “the meaning and scope of which correspond to Article 3” of the Convention (§ 83). Or else when that legislation fails to take any account of the seriousness of the offence committed and does not allow the national court to take account of the individual circumstances of the particular case with a view to adjusting or reducing the sentence imposed or reclassifying the offence (§ 84).
Against this background, the CJEU then turns to the Romanian law at stake and identifies several such possibilities for individualising or reducing the sentence. It notes that some of these possibilities were available in DZ’s case, but that the competent Romanian court considered that none of the relevant mitigating or other case-specific circumstances justified a reduction. DZ had also challenged his sentence on appeal and on a further appeal on a point of law.
This leads the CJEU to conclude:
Accordingly, national legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings cannot give rise to a finding of deficiencies such as those referred to in paragraph 63 above. The execution of a European arrest warrant issued for the purposes of executing a custodial sentence imposed in accordance with such legislation cannot, therefore, be refused under Article 1(3) of Framework Decision 2002/584, read in the light of Article 49(3) of the Charter. (§ 92)
Consequently, the second step of the two-step examination was not called for. (§ 93)
The limits of the two-step methodology
This case illustrates the limits of the two-step methodology promoted by the CJEU in EAW matters.
After extensive doctrinal explanations concerning mutual trust and mutual recognition, the judgment concentrates on the Romanian legislation itself and the possibilities it offers for adjusting sentences.
The mere existence of such possibilities is then sufficient for the CJEU to conclude that there are no systemic deficiencies and that the surrender of DZ can go ahead, allowing him to serve seven years in prison for the importation of three grams of cannabis and four MDMA pills. Logically, in the context of an assessment entirely focused on the existence of systemic deficiencies, the fact that the competent Romanian judge did not make use of the available possibilities to reduce the sentence is of no relevance to the CJEU. The assessment that none of the mitigating or other specific circumstances was applicable “was a matter for that court alone to determine” (§ 90).
At no point does the CJEU examine how that legislation is applied in practice by the Romanian courts, in particular whether their failure to make use of the available legal mechanisms to reduce disproportionate mandatory minimum sentences might reflect a standard practice amounting to a systemic or generalised deficiency within the meaning of the first step.
Rather, the actual outcome of the application of Romanian criminal law to DZ is effectively excluded from scrutiny by the executing judicial authority.
Proportionality of the sentence or proportionality of the legislation?
This outcome raises a serious methodological issue.
The CJEU has, in effect, transformed the very nature of the concern about which the referring court sought guidance. This complaint was about the proportionality of the sentence imposed on DZ. The issue was whether a seven-year prison sentence for the conduct in question was compatible with Article 49(3) of the EU-Charter.
However, by effectively boxing itself into the first step of its two-step methodology, the CJEU has transformed this into a question about the proportionality of the applicable Romanian legislation as such; into a question about whether that legislation, viewed in the abstract, provided sufficient possibilities for individualising and adjusting sentences? Yet, when it comes to the protection of fundamental rights, what matters is not so much what the legislation allows in theory, but rather how it is actually applied to individuals in practice.
The contrast with the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights is particularly striking. The latter consistently states that its task is not to review the relevant law and practice in abstracto, but to determine whether the manner in which they were applied to an applicant gave rise to a violation of the Convention (see, among many others, Hauschildt v. Denmark, § 45). It is the actual treatment of the individual, and the consequences of the application of the law in his or her particular circumstances, which matter.
Against this background, the CJEU’s reference to Article 4 of the EU-Charter as corresponding in meaning and scope to Article 3 ECHR (paragraphs 83 and 88) is rather misleading. The fact that the two provisions “correspond” does not mean that the two European courts apply the same methodology when assessing complaints of inhuman or degrading punishment (see, in relation to the application of EAWs, among others: Is the CJEU creating two different categories of fundamental rights?).
Whereas the ECtHR’s approach under Article 3 of the Convention is necessarily based on an individual assessment of the circumstances and consequences of the treatment or punishment in question, in Tagu, the CJEU has made the possibility for national courts of scrutinising the individual sentence dependent on the prior establishment of structural deficiencies in the issuing State’s legislation, assessed only in the light of the relevant legislation considered in the abstract. These are two very different approaches to fundamental rights protection.
The Convention still matters
One further aspect of the judgment deserves particular attention.
In paragraph 76, the CJEU states that:
‚the assessment of such a risk must be carried out by the executing judicial authority having regard to the standard of protection of fundamental rights guaranteed by EU law and not on the basis of national law.‚
Thus, the CJEU appears to overlook that the Convention forms part of the Romanian legal order, and that, as an EU Member State, Romania remains bound by its obligations under that Convention. EU law does not displace those obligations, nor does the primacy of EU law over national law release Member States from their independent obligations under the Convention. Because there is no primacy of EU law over the Convention.
The Dutch courts should therefore not treat the CJEU’s judgment as the last word on the matter. Their decisions as executing judicial authorities remain open to scrutiny by the ECtHR. And the latter has established that grossly disproportionate prison sentences may, in certain circumstances, amount to inhuman or degrading punishment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention.
Admittedly, the ECtHR considers that this test will only be met on rare and unique occasions (see, among others, Vinter and Others v. the United Kingdom, § 102). However, this Article 3 at least allows an assessment on the merits to be made by the executing judicial authorities on the proportionality of a concrete prison sentence imposed by the issuing judicial authority, regardless of rulings by the CJEU under EU law. Failure to do so might expose the executing judicial authorities to a finding of a violation of Article 3, as happened in Bivolaru and Moldovan v. France.
Thus, in the case at hand there is nothing to prevent DZ from challenging his transfer to Romania under Article 3 of the Convention. For an assessment of the proportionality of the sentence rather than on the proportionality of the legislation.
