In the case of Greenpeace Nordic and Others v. Norway (28.10.2025, 34068/21), the ECtHR handed down its fourth judgment on the duties of the Sates as regards climate change. It provides a good opportunity to compare the Strasbourg approach with the EU approach to climate change as such, as it is set out in Regulation 2021/1119 establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality (‘European Climate Law’), implementing part of the European Green Deal.

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The principal facts of this case were summarized in the ECtHR’s press release as follows (emphasis added):

“The applicants are six Norwegian nationals born between 1995 and 2001 who live in Oslo, and two non-governmental organisations, Greenpeace Nordic and Young Friends of the Earth Norway, based in Norway. The individual applicants are all current or former members of Young Friends of the Earth.

On 10 June 2016 the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy awarded ten licences to 13 private companies for petroleum gas production on the Norwegian continental shelf, where Norway’s offshore petroleum activities take place. The two applicant organisations sought a review of the validity of that decision. On 4 January 2018 the Oslo City Court held that the decision had been valid.

On 22 December 2020 the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal by the applicants, holding, by a majority of 11 votes to 4, that the decision granting the licences had been valid and finding that the effects of possible future emissions as a result of the licences awarded did not constitute an “immediate risk” and, consequently, that the issue did not fall within Article 8 of the Convention.

Relying on Articles 2 (right to life) and 8 (right to respect for private and family life), the applicants complained that, before issuing the petroleum production licences, the authorities had not conducted an environmental impact assessment (“an EIA”) of the potential impact of petroleum extraction on Norway’s obligations to mitigate climate change.”

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Greenpeace Nordic focusses on Article 8 of the Convention and the procedural obligations of the State when granting licences in the context of petroleum exploration and extraction, considered within the State’s broader duty to effectively protect individuals from serious adverse effects of climate change on their life, health, well-being and quality of life (§ 317).

Before addressing these procedural aspects, the ECtHR rejected the victim status of the individual applicants, but not that of the two NGOs, and recalled the following key substantive principles which it identified in its seminal ruling in Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland. These principles are:

• Under Article 8 of the Convention States must ensure effective protection of persons within their jurisdiction from serious harms to life, health, well-being, and quality of life caused by climate change.
• States have a primary duty to adopt and effectively implement regulations and measures that can mitigate current and potentially irreversible future climate impacts.
• States retain a wide margin of appreciation in deciding how to fulfil their climate-related obligations.
• Climate protection should weigh heavily when balancing it against competing interests. (§§ 314-316)

The ECtHR then identified the following procedural requirements applicable in the context of the licencing of dangerous activities having an impact on climate change:

• Before authorising any potentially dangerous activity, States must conduct an environmental impact assessment (EIA) that is adequate, timely, comprehensive, undertaken in good faith, and based on the best available science.
• The purpose of the EIA is to safeguard individuals’ right to effective protection from serious climate-related risks to their life, health, well-being, and quality of life.
• For petroleum production projects, the EIA must at minimum include:
  • A quantification of all anticipated greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, including combustion emissions both domestically and abroad.
  • An assessment by public authorities of whether the project is compatible with national and international obligations to take effective measures against the adverse effects of climate change.
• Informed public consultation must occur early, when all options remain open and pollution can still be effectively prevented at the source.

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Applying these criteria to the case at hand, the ECtHR noted that Norway’s petroleum activities operated under a three-stage regulatory framework involving a strategic EIA before opening areas to exploration, no formal EIA requirement during the licensing (exploration) stage, and an EIA and public consultation – subject to possible waivers – at the Plan for Development and Operation (PDO) stage prior to extraction, with both later stages subject to judicial review.

The ECtHR found that the assessments leading to the 2016 decision were not fully comprehensive, as key climate-related impacts, including exported combustion emissions, were deferred to later stages or to general climate policy. It noted that several extraction projects had been authorised without assessing combustion emissions, a practice that could undermine the purpose of timely and comprehensive EIAs.

However, the ECtHR gave greater weight to structural developments strengthening compliance: the Norwegian Supreme Court’s recognition of a constitutional duty not to approve PDOs inconsistent with climate considerations, the EFTA Court’s ruling requiring retrospective EIAs to remedy omissions without circumventing the law, and the Government’s assurance that combustion-emission assessments and public consultations would occur before decisions. Finding no structural deficiencies in the system and concluding that deferred EIAs could still satisfy Article 8 requirements, the ECtHR held that there had been no violation of Article 8 and that it was not necessary to examine separately the complaints under Article 2 of the Convention.

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At this stage, it is worth asking what the specificity and added value of the Strasbourg approach to climate change is, when compared with the EU approach, as set out in Regulation 2021/1119. To answer this question, one should first briefly recapitulate the main elements of that Regulation.

In essence, Regulation 2021/1119 establishes a framework for achieving climate neutrality within the EU by 2050 and provides for a binding EU target of a net domestic reduction in greenhouse-gas emissions by at least 55% (compared to 1990 levels) by 2030. The relevant Union institutions and the Member States must take the necessary measures at Union and national level, respectively, to enable the collective achievement of the climate-neutrality objective. To that effect, intermediate climate targets have been defined in Article 4 of the Regulation.

Interestingly, under the Regulation it is for the European Commission to assess the progress made at national and EU level made towards achieving its goals (Art. 6 to 8). To that effect, the Commission must, inter alia, assess every 5 years the progress which the EU and the Member States have made towards the 2050 and adaptation objectives, and to assess whether the EU and national measures towards those objectives are consistent. It must also evaluate whether draft EU measures and legislation, including budgetary proposals, are consistent with the 2030 and 2040 targets and the 2050 climate-neutrality objectives.

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When comparing the EU approach with the Strasbourg approach, one should first note the broad agreement between them on the need to tackle climate change through both long-term and intermediate greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets (Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz, § 550). To some extent, the targets set out in Regulation 2021/1119 therefore also represent the way chosen by the EU Member States to fulfil their obligations under Article 8 of the Convention. By setting 2050 as the target date for climate neutrality, the Member States even intend to be quicker than required by the ECtHR, which considers that this neutrality should be reached “within, in principle, the next three decades” (§ 548). That said, the ECtHR also acknowledges that current global mitigation efforts are not sufficient to meet the target of limiting the rise in temperature to 1.5° C above pre-industrial levels, as set in the Paris Agreement (§ 436).

However, the Strasbourg approach, grounded in the activity of the ECtHR, is also characterized by significant specificities that represent added value compared with the EU approach.

First, there is a fundamental difference between the ECtHR’s judicial review of States’ compliance with obligations arising from internationally protected fundamental rights, invoked by citizens and associations, and the European Commission’s non-judicial assessment of the “progress” made by Member States in achieving goals that they themselves have set. The ECtHR itself highlighted the importance of access to justice in this field (§ 639). Of course, the European Commission could theoretically initiate infringement proceedings before the CJEU under Articles 258-260 TFEU, but such a move might remain rather exceptional in this context.

At the same time, because of the complexity of the issues and the State’s margin of appreciation, the ECtHR declines to prescribe specific compliance measures and leaves it to the respondent State, under the supervision of the Committee of Ministers, to determine and implement appropriate measures in line with the judgment (§ 657).

The Strasbourg approach also constitutes confirmation, at the highest European judicial level and in line with the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on the Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change, that the duty to protect the environment and the climate is a legal obligation directly flowing from enforceable fundamental rights, primarily Article 8 of the Convention. By contrast, Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 contains only one reference, in Recital 6 of its Preamble, to Article 37 of the EU Charter, which however does not lay down an enforceable right.

Being primarily based on Article 8 of the Convention, and thus not hinging on any legislative act interpreting that provision in the climate change context, the Strasbourg approach also allows for greater flexibility in adjusting the requirements to the national situation at hand, together with greater speed in addressing a compliance issue, including by national courts. The ECtHR indeed emphasised “the key role which domestic courts have played and will play in climate-change litigation” (§ 639). This might allow national courts and the ECtHR to hear cases brought against EU Member States under Article 8 of the Convention. For its part, however, the European Commission has the advantage of being empowered to assess the situation not only at national but also at EU level, which the ECtHR is prevented from doing.

A striking example of the ECtHR’s greater flexibility is to be found precisely in Greenpeace Nordic, where the ECtHR inferred requirements from Article 8 of the Convention concerning procedures for granting petroleum extraction licences.

This stands in contrast to the CJEU, which is far more reluctant to treat fundamental rights, considered autonomously, as the starting point of its analysis. This might also be due to Article 51(2) of the EU-Charter, according to which the fundamental rights of the Charter are not allowed to extend the field of application of Union law beyond the powers of the Union. Moreover, as matters currently stand, the CJEU is hardly accessible by individuals or associations complaining about climate change, owing to its very strict interpretation of Article 263(4) TFEU (see the Joint Factsheet by the Registry of the ECtHR and the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights).

Finally, Greenpeace Nordic highlights another defining feature of the Strasbourg approach – once again in contrast with the Luxembourg approach – namely its openness to international law and jurisprudence. In line with Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and many others, Greenpeace Nordic indeed extensively relies on the Advisory Opinions on climate change by the International Court of Justice, the EFTA Court, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (§§ 321-324). The ECtHR even indirectly added weight to the existing international law on climate change by ordering the Norwegian authorities to assess whether the planned activity is compatible with their obligations under national and international law to take effective measures against the adverse effects of climate change (§ 319).

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In sum, the open-ended structure of Article 8, together with its enforceable nature, allows the ECtHR to advance legally binding case-law that addresses, in a comprehensive, flexible and timely manner, the urgent problem posed by climate change, pending any support from the CJEU in this field. That said, there is no doubt that, when faced with the immense challenge of rapidly and effectively addressing ongoing climate change, Strasbourg, Brussels, and Luxembourg – in close cooperation with national courts, as suggested by the ECtHR – must join forces.