Recent Case Law

On this page you will find in reverse chronological order an overview of some recent case-law, from the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) but also from some other Supreme Courts, which is considered of interest for a better understanding of the interaction between the European and national legal orders in the field of fundamental rights. Excerpts and comments therefore concentrate on this issue.

Bivolaru and Moldovan v. France

In the landmark case of Bivolaru and Moldovan v. France (25.3.2021, 40324/16 and 12623/17, not final), the European Court of Human Rights ruled on the execution of two European arrest warrants (EAWs) for the purpose of the service of prison sentences in Romania. It found a violation of Article 3 of the Convention (prohibition of ill-treatment) in respect of one of the applicants and no violation in respect of the other. The details of the case are summarized in the press release below.

The judgment is noteworthy as it confirms and clarifies the principles to be applied by the domestic courts of the EU member States in the field of mutual recognition.

First of all, the judgment once more confirms that the Convention requires EU law to be applied in conformity with it. It equally confirms and illustrates the competence of the ECHR to assess that conformity.

The judgment furthermore recapitulates the Court’s doctrine on mutual recognition, as set out in Avotins v. Latvia (23.5.2016, 17502/07), which is the leading case on this topic. It stresses in particular that:

  • The presumption of equivalent protection, as established in Bosphorus v. Ireland (30.6.2005, 45036/98), in principle applies when by virtue of a mutual recognition mechanism domestic courts are left with no discretionary power and legally bound to presume that another member State sufficiently respects fundamental rights. When this presumption applies, the Convention will be breached only if there has been a manifest deficiency in complying with the Convention.
  • In cases concerning the compatibility of the execution of an EAW with Article 3 of the Convention, any discretionary power of the judicial authority of the executing State in this field is limited to the assessment of the facts and has to be exercised within the framework strictly delineated by the case-law of the CJEU. The presumption of equivalent protection therefore applies.
  • The principle of mutual recognition must nonetheless not be applied in an automatic and mechanical way, to the detriment of fundamental rights.
  • Consequently, if a serious and substantiated complaint is raised before domestic courts to the effect that the protection of a Convention right has been manifestly deficient and that this situation cannot be remedied by European Union law, they cannot refrain from examining that complaint on the sole ground that they are applying EU law. In that case they must apply EU law in conformity with the Convention.
  • These principles apply to all mechanisms of mutual recognition.

The judgment also provides some interesting information on how these principles play out in the field of European arrest warrants.

In this respect, it first notes the convergence between the case-law of the two European Courts as regards the assessment of the individual risks of ill-treatment to which persons can be exposed as a consequence of the execution of a EAW. At the same time, it stresses the different methodology applied by each Court: whereas the CJEU applies a two-step examination requiring evidence of systemic or generalised deficiencies in the issuing State before any individual risk resulting from these deficiencies can be identified (see e.g., below on this page, CJEU 17.12.2020, Openbaar Ministerie, joined cases C-354/20 PPU and C-412/20 PPU, para. 53-56), the ECHR focuses immediately on the individual risks incurred by the person concerned.

Thus, the convergence noted by the ECHR relates to the final individual test, not to the respective methodologies applied by the European Courts, which remain different and are therefore not interchangeable. This is illustrated by the fact that in the case of Moldovan, the ECHR found a violation of Article 3 on the ground that the French courts had transferred the applicant in spite of the fact that they had before them sufficient factual elements indicating that he would be exposed to a serious risk of ill-treatment by reason of the detention conditions in the prison in which he would be detained after his transfer. These factual elements only concerned the personal situation of Mr Moldovan, not any systemic or generalized deficiencies. At no point in this judgment did the ECHR inquire about such deficiencies in the Romanian prison system, contrary to the French courts which were bound by EU law to apply the two-step examination. The ECHR nonetheless found a violation of Article 3 on account of the fact that the individual risk incurred by Mr Moldovan had not been correctly assessed by those French courts.

This was the first time the Court rebutted the presumption of equivalent protection, because of a manifest deficiency in applying a mutual recognition mechanism. Thus, regardless of the methodology applied by the domestic courts, what matters from a Convention point of view is the correct application of the Convention standards in any individual case governed by EU law.

Finally, the judgment also illustrates the fact that in the field of mutual recognition the test to be applied in respect of complaints not covered by the presumption of equivalent protection (because of the discretionary power left to the judicial authority of the executing State or the latter’s failure to make a referral for a preliminary ruling by the CJEU) is the higher benchmark of whether the Convention has been breached, not whether there has been a manifest deficiency (§§ 131-132).

R.R. and Others v. Hungary

In the case of R.R. and Others v. Hungary (2.3.2021, 36037/17, not final), the European Court of Human Rights found several breaches of the Convention on account of the de facto deprivation of liberty (Art. 5) and the living conditions of asylum-seekers (Art. 3) in the Röszke transit zone, on the Hungarian-Serbian border.

The ECHR distinguished the circumstances prevailing in this case from those which had recently lead it, in the case of lias and Ahmed v. Hungary (21.11.2019, 47287/15), to find no violation of these provisions of the Convention (see below, the post on this judgment). Significant differences indeed lay in the fact that the applicants, an Iranian-Afghan family of five with three young children, were particularly vulnerable and that their stay in the transit zone had by far exceeded the time needed for the examination of an asylum request, due to inaction on the part of the Hungarian authorities.

Interestingly, the ECHR in its reasoning also relied on several prescriptions of the EU Reception Directive (2013/33) which in its opinion had not been complied with by the authorities (§§ 54 and 58).

With regard to the question whether there has been a deprivation of liberty, the judgment confirms the case-by-case approach followed by the ECHR in such matters, which is in contrast with the more abstract approach resulting from the application of Union law, as illustrated by the rulings of the CJEU in the cases of FMS and Others (C-924/19 PPU and C-925/19 PPU) and Commission v. Hungary (C-808/18; see below, the posts on these judgments). There is nonetheless some valuable interaction between the two approaches. Not only did the ECHR rely on Union law in its reasoning, making its requirements relevant in assessing compliance with the Convention, but by doing so it indirectly also provided some ex post assessment as to whether Union law was respected in the present case, along with its findings on whether the Convention was violated or not.

Consob

In the Consob case (2.2.2021, C-481/19), which concerned proceedings relating to the lawfulness of penalties imposed for offences of insider dealing and failure to cooperate in the context of an investigation conducted by the Italian National Companies and Stock Exchange Commission (Consob), the CJEU ruled on the interpretation of Articles 47 and 48 of the EU-Charter and on the validity and interpretation of provisions contained in two legal instruments dealing with market abuse (Directive 2003/6 and Regulation 596/2014). When inquiring about the protection of the right to silence provided by Articles 47 and 48 of the EU-Charter, the CJEU drew to a large extent, by virtue of Article 52(3) of the EU-Charter, on the case-law of the ECHR relating to that right (para. 36-43).

Openbaar Ministerie

In the case of Openbaar Ministerie (joined cases C-354/20 PPU and C-412/20 PPU, 17.12.2020) the Amsterdam District Court was called upon to decide upon the surrender of a person to the Polish authorities on the basis of a European arrest warrant (EAW) issued for the purpose of conducting a criminal investigation. It referred the case to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling on whether, in view of existing evidence of systemic or generalised deficiencies concerning the independence of the judiciary in Poland, the EAW was nonetheless to be executed.

In response, the CJEU confirmed in the following terms the two-step methodology which it had previously set out in the case of Minister for Justice and Equality (Deficiencies in the system of justice, C-216/18 PPU, 25.7.2018):

Where the executing judicial authority … has material … indicating that there is a real risk of breach of the fundamental right to a fair trial guaranteed by the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter, on account of systemic or generalised deficiencies so far as concerns the independence of the issuing Member State’s judiciary, that authority must determine, specifically and precisely, whether, having regard to his or her personal situation, to the nature of the offence for which he or she is being prosecuted and the factual context in which the European arrest warrant was issued, and in the light of the information provided by that Member State pursuant to Article 15(2) of that framework decision, there are substantial grounds for believing that that person will run such a risk if he or she is surrendered to that Member State. (§ 52)

Thus, according to the CJEU, the possibility of refusing to execute a European arrest warrant for such reasons presupposes a two-step examination covering, first, the general situation of the judiciary in the State concerned and, secondly, the impact which this situation is likely to have on the fairness of the trial to which the person concerned will be subjected if surrendered (§ 53). Accordingly, it would appear that such a refusal could not lawfully be decided under Union law on the basis of evidence which concerned only the person to be surrendered and was not backed-up by evidence of existing systemic or generalised deficiencies concerning the independence of the issuing Member State’s judiciary (see, in the same vein, concerning Art. 4 of the EU-Charter (prohibition of ill-treatment), CJUE 5.4.2016, Aranyosi et Căldăraru, C-404/15 et C-659/15 PPU).

This methodology might usefully be compared with the one applied by the ECHR in respect of applications challenging the execution of a EAW on account of a violation of Article 6 of the Convention (fair trial), as in Pirozzi v. Belgium (17.4.2018, no. 21055/11; discussed in a post below). While the ECHR can be expected, in such a context, to have regard to any systemic or general deficiencies in the issuing Member State, the existence of such deficiencies would not appear to be a pre-requisite to any finding of a breach in an individual case. This is because, in the context of an individual application under Article 34 of the Convention, the ECHR focuses on the particular circumstances of the individual case (see, mutatis mutandis, Taxquet v. Belgium, 16.11.2010, no. 926/05, § 83).

The question therefore arises whether such methodological differences could perhaps generate different protection levels, not least in terms of the burden of proof. It would indeed appear that no proof of any systemic or generalised deficiencies in the issuing State is required for a real and individual risk of a “flagrant denial of a fair trial” to amount to a potential breach of Article 6 of the Convention (see ECHR 7.7.1989, Soering v. United Kingdom, no. 14038/88, § 113; 4.5.2010, Stapleton v. Ireland (dec.)no. 56588/07, § 25).

Commission v. Hungary

In the case of Commission v. Hungary (17.12.2020, C-808/18) the CJEU again addressed a number of issues in connection with the treatment of asylum-seekers in transit zones located in the immediate vicinity of the Serbian-Hungarian border. From a Convention perspective, two specific aspects are worth highlighting.

First, in interpreting the relevant provisions of the Procedure Directive (no. 2013/32) the CJEU stresses the need for the domestic authorities to ensure effective access to procedures for international protection:

Article 6 of Directive 2013/32 requires Member States to ensure that the persons concerned are able to exercise in an effective manner the right to make an application for international protection, including at their borders, as soon as they declare their wish of doing so, so that that application is registered and can be lodged and examined in effective observance of the time limits laid down by that directive. (§ 106)

This concern about ensuring effective access to procedures for international protection appears to be common to the two European Courts. For it lies also at the heart of the recent judgment in the case of N.D. and N.T. v. Spain (13.2.2020, nos. 8675/15 and 8697/15) in which the European Court of Human Rights ruled:

With regard to Contracting States like Spain whose borders coincide, at least partly, with external borders of the Schengen area, the effectiveness of Convention rights requires that these States make available genuine and effective access to means of legal entry, in particular border procedures for those who have arrived at the border. Those means should allow all persons who face persecution to submit an application for protection, based in particular on Article 3 of the Convention, under conditions which ensure that the application is processed in a manner consistent with the international norms, including the Convention. In the context of the present case the Court also refers to the approach reflected in the Schengen Borders Code. The implementation of Article 4(1) of the Code, which provides that external borders may be crossed only at border crossing points and during the fixed opening hours, presupposes the existence of a sufficient number of such crossing points. … However, where such arrangements exist and secure the right to request protection under the Convention, and in particular Article 3, in a genuine and effective manner, the Convention does not prevent States, in the fulfilment of their obligation to control borders, from requiring applications for such protection to be submitted at the existing border crossing points. (§§ 209-210)

In this context, both Courts also concur in considering that an application for international protection is deemed to have been made as soon as the person concerned has declared, to one of the competent authorities, his or her wish to receive international protection, without the declaration of that wish being subject to any administrative formality whatsoever (see §§ 96-97 of the CJEU ruling and § 180 of N.D. and N.T.).

Secondly, the CJEU also confirmed its assessment, made in FMS and Others, C-924/19 PPU and C-925/19 PPU (see below, the post on this judgment), according to which the conditions prevailing in the transit zones of Röszke and Tompa amounted to detention, within the meaning of Article 2(h) of the Reception Directive (2013/33). This is in contrast with ECHR 21.11.2019, Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary (no. 47287/15), § 249, in which the ECHR found that restrictions in such transit zones could only amount to a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Article 5 of the Convention if they exceeded what was strictly necessary for the purpose of examining the application for international protection of the person concerned. The implications of this difference are explained below, in the post devoted to FMS and Others.

Centraal Israëlitisch Consistorie van België and Others

In the case of Centraal Israëlitisch Consistorie van België and Others (17.12.2020 C-336/19) the CJEU ruled that in order to promote animal welfare in the context of ritual slaughter, Member States may, without infringing the fundamental rights enshrined in the EU-Charter, require a reversible stunning procedure which cannot result in the animal’s death. The CJEU reached this conclusion after striking a balance between freedom of religion, guaranteed by Article 10 of the EU-Charter, and animal welfare, as set out in Article 13 TFEU and given specific expression to in Regulation No 1099/2009 of 24 September 2009 on the protection of animals at the time of killing.

From a Convention perspective, several aspects of the ruling of the CJEU are worth mentioning. They represent interesting steps as regards the methodology to be applied in respect of fundamental rights which the Convention and the Charter have in common.

First, in interpreting Article 10 of the Charter the CJEU draws to a significant extent on the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights relating to Article 9 of the Convention. It did so relying on Article 52(3) of the Charter, in the following terms:

In that regard, it should be borne in mind that Article 52(3) of the Charter is intended to ensure the necessary consistency between the rights contained in the Charter and the corresponding rights guaranteed in the ECHR, without adversely affecting the autonomy of EU law and that of the Court of Justice of the European Union. Account must, therefore, be taken of the corresponding rights of the ECHR for the purpose of interpreting the Charter, as the minimum threshold of protection …. Since it is apparent from the explanations relating to Article 10 of the Charter that the freedom guaranteed in paragraph 1 thereof corresponds to the freedom guaranteed in Article 9 of the ECHR, that freedom must be taken into account for the purpose of interpreting Article 10(1) of the Charter. (§ 56)

The fact that the reference to the corresponding rights of the Convention as the minimum threshold of protection comes after a reminder about the need not to affect adversely the autonomy of EU law and of the CJEU might suggest, apparently for the first time in the Luxembourg case-law, that it is now being accepted that this autonomy cannot lead to the protection of fundamental rights under EU law to fall below the level of protection under the Convention. This would be in keeping with the Explanations relating to Article 52(3) of the Charter, according to which “In any event, the level of protection afforded by the Charter may never be lower than that guaranteed by the ECHR.”

Secondly, when it comes to examining the limitations applied in the present case to the exercise of the rights under Article 10 of the Charter, the CJEU stresses in § 58 of the ruling the similarities existing in this regard between the Convention (Art. 9 § 2) and the Charter (Art. 52(1)). Interestingly, and here again, apparently for the first time in the Luxembourg case-law, the CJEU then goes on to indicate that the justification of these limitations should be assessed having regard at the same time to both Article 52(1) and (3) of the Charter:

It is in the light of those considerations that it must be examined whether national legislation, which lays down the obligation to stun the animal beforehand during ritual slaughter, while stipulating that that stunning should be reversible and not cause the animal’s death, fulfils the conditions laid down in Article 52(1) and (3) of the Charter, read in conjunction with Article 13 TFEU. (§ 59)

Last but not least, the ruling contains another first-time reference which is another step towards the Convention protecting system, i.e. the endorsement of the well-known Strasbourg living instrument doctrine:

Like the ECHR, the Charter is a living instrument which must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions and of the ideas prevailing in democratic States today (see, by analogy, ECtHR, 7 July 2011, Bayatyan v. Armenia [GC], CE:ECHR:2011:0707JUD002345903, § 102 and the case-law cited), with the result that regard must be had to changes in values and ideas, both in terms of society and legislation, in the Member States. (§ 77)

Addis

In the case of Addis (C-517/17, 16.7.2020), the CJEU ruled on the failure by a German administrative authority to comply with the obligation, laid down in the Procedures Directive (2013/32/EU), to give an applicant for international protection the opportunity of a personal interview before the adoption of a decision declaring his application inadmissible on account of the fact that he had entered Germany from a safe country, namely Italy.

Relying on Articles 14 and 34 of this Directive and the importance of such an interview in order to avoid expulsions which would entail a breach of Article 4 of the EU-Charter (§ 52), the CJEU decided that such a failure should lead to the said decision being annulled and the case being remitted to the determining authority, unless the applicable domestic law allows the applicant, in an appeal procedure, to set out in person all of his or her arguments against the decision in a hearing which complies with the detailed conditions and fundamental guarantees set out in Article 15 of the Procedures Directive (“requirements for a personal interview”), and those arguments are not capable of altering that decision. The CJEU thereby stressed that compliance with the safeguards laid down in Article 15 was essential in preserving the effectiveness of the right to be heard at that subsequent stage of the procedure (§ 71).

Interestingly, the CJEU contrasted this approach with its ruling in M. G. & N. R. (C-383/13 PPU, 10.9.2013) according to which “in principle, an infringement of the rights of the defence results in annulment of the decision taken at the end of the administrative procedure at issue only if the outcome of the procedure might have been different had it not been for such an irregularity”. It justified the different approach adopted in Addis by referring to the binding nature of the prescriptions laid down in Article 15 and the paramount importance of a personal interview in the procedure for examination of an application of international protection (§ 70). However, considering the fact that M. G. & N. R. was about detention under the Return Directive, a no less serious interference with civil liberties, and that the case for an interview in this case was pleaded by reference to such fundamental rights as the rights of the defence and the right to be heard, one may wonder why the Addis approach was not adopted already in M. G. & N. R. For what can be the sense of hearing a person only when it can be anticipated that he or she might come up with unforeseen arguments? How can the actual enjoyment of a fundamental right be made conditional upon the prediction of the unpredictable? (For a critical view on this judgment, see Johan Callewaert, “To accede or not to accede: European protection of human rights at the crossroads”, European journal of Human Rights, 2014, p. 506-7).

Be that as it may, the emphasis in Addis on preserving the effectiveness of the safeguards provided by the Procedures Directive has much in common with the approach recently followed by the ECHR in such matters. In N.D. & N.T. v. Spain, another migration case (nos. 8675/15 and 8697/15, 13.2.2020, see below on this page), the ECHR stressed that by virtue of Article 4 of Protocol no. 4 (prohibition of collective expulsions), Contracting States to the Convention are under an obligation to provide persons seeking international protection with an effective access to their territory and to procedures allowing for an effective examination of their application. And in Khlaifia and Others v. Italy (no. 16483/12, 15.12.2016), it stated: “Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 does not guarantee the right to an individual interview in all circumstances; the requirements of this provision may be satisfied where each alien has a genuine and effective possibility of submitting arguments against his or her expulsion, and where those arguments are examined in an appropriate manner by the authorities of the respondent State.” (§ 248)

Michnea v. Romania

In the case of Michnea v. Romania (no. 10395/19, 7.7.2020) the Court ruled under Article 8 of the Convention (right to respect for family life) on the refusal by the domestic courts to order the return of a child to Italy, from where she had been taken to Romania by her mother without the father’s consent.

In so doing, the Court stressed the duty of the domestic courts to interpret and apply the relevant provisions of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction and of the Brussels II bis Regulation (Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003) so as to secure the applicant’s rights guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention (§ 45), which itself had to be interpreted in the light of those international instruments (§ 43).

In casu, the Court found that in interpreting and applying the Hague Convention and the Brussels II bis Regulation, the domestic courts had failed to secure the guarantees of Article 8. It considered in particular that they had not correctly applied the notion of “habitual residence of the child”, as interpreted by the CJEU in the case of Barbara Mercredi (C-497/10 PPU, 22.12.2010).

An interesting aspect of this judgment is certainly the fact that the scrutiny performed by the Court thus involves an indirect assessment of whether the domestic courts complied with relevant EU law provisions, thereby reinforcing the impact of EU law in domestic law.

See also, in the same vein, the judgment of the same date in the case of Voica v. Romania (no. 9256/19) in which the Court found no violation of Article 8 on account of the fact that the domestic courts had ordered the children’s return from Romania to France.

FMS and Others

In the case of FMS and Others (C-924/19 PPU and C-925/19 PPU, 14.5.2020), the CJEU ruled on several aspects of the situation of asylum seekers in the Röszke transit zone, which is located on Hungarian territory, at the border with Serbia. One of the findings by the CJEU is that the accommodation in this transit zone amounts to a de facto detention of asylum seekers (§ 231). Yet, in the case of Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary (see below, on this page), the ECHR found the same living conditions experienced by the applicants in the same transit zone not to have amounted to a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Article 5 of the Convention, with the consequence that this provision was declared inapplicable.

Does it follow from this that EU law better protects asylum seekers from detention in transit zones? Not necessarily. The qualification as detention of the accommodation in a transit zone is indeed a pre-condition for the start of the four weeks deadline set by Article 43(2) of the Procedures Directive as the maximum length of detention of asylum seekers in such a zone. This means, in practical terms, that a detention of up to four weeks is in principle acceptable under EU law, regardless of individual circumstances.

By contrast, even if Article 5 of the Convention does not in principle apply from the very beginning of a stay in a transit zone such as Röszke, at the border of two States, this can change any time in view of individual circumstances, i.e. from the moment when restrictions to the liberty of movement of asylum seekers exceed what is strictly necessary for the processing of their asylum applications (see § 233 of the Ilias and Ahmed judgment). There is no reason why this could not occur before the expiry of a four weeks period, with the consequence that Article 5 would then most likely also be breached and require an immediate lifting of the impugned restrictions (see, mutatis mutandis, CEDH 23.2.2012, Creanga v. Romania, 29226/03, §§ 97 and 100).

Thus, this comparison clearly demonstrates the methodological differences between the two systems. While EU law operates on the basis of an abstract deadline of four weeks to be triggered by the finding of the existence of a detention from the beginning of the stay concerned, Article 5 of the Convention allows for a case-by-case assessment of the living conditions in transit zones and an “activation” of the ban on arbitrary detentions from the moment when those conditions exceed what is strictly necessary in the circumstances.

Consequently, domestic courts of EU Member States should not confine themselves to examining such situations under only one of the legal systems concerned. For depending on the circumstances, either of them can provide the higher protection against unlawful detention of asylum seekers. In such a situation, domestic courts of EU Member States are indeed bound to apply the higher protection (Article 52(3) of the EU-Charter).

Bevándorlási és Menekültügyi Hivatal

The case of Bevándorlási és Menekültügyi Hivatal (C-564/18), adjudicated by the CJEU on 19 March 2020, is very similar to the case of Ahmed and Ilias v. Hungary (see below, on this page) which was decided a few months earlier, on 21 November 2019, by the ECHR. In both cases the main issue was the way Hungarian courts had made use of the possibility, provided for by article 33.2 (c) of the Procedures Directive, to declare a request for international protection inadmissible on the ground that a country which is not a Member State is considered as a safe third country for the applicant.

The CJEU found the domestic legislation not to have adequately transposed the Directive by omitting to incorporate some of its basic requirements, including the principle of non-refoulement. It thereby came, in substance, much to the same conclusion as the ECHR, which for its part had found, inter alia, Hungarian courts to have breached the procedural obligations flowing from Article 3 of the Convention.

Interestingly, however, and in contrast with the ECHR ruling, the CJEU elaborated on the requirement, for a third country to be able to be considered safe, that there be a connection between the applicant and the third country concerned on the basis of which it would be reasonable for that person to go to that country (Art. 38.2 (a) of the Directive). In its opinion, the mere fact of transiting through a specific country could not be considered as amounting to such a connection.

No such requirement flows from the Convention. In this respect, EU law would appear to offer a higher protection standard. This, however, is in line with Article 53 of the Convention, which allows States to exceed the minimum Convention protection standard, including on the basis of EU law (see, on this latter aspect, mutatis mutandis, M.N. v. Belgium (dec.), no. 3599/18, 5.5.2020, § 140).

AGRO IN 2001

In the case of AGRO IN 2001 (19.3.2020), a Bulgarian judge asked the CJEU whether under EU law he could lawfully order the confiscation of the assets of persons on account of criminal offences – embezzling of funds – the same persons had been charged with in criminal proceedings which were still pending. The CJEU ruled that the relevant legal instrument, Framework Decision 2005/212 on the confiscation of crime-related proceeds, instrumentalities and property (“the FD”), was not applicable in the present case, since the scope of the FD was limited to criminal proceedings, whereas under Bulgarian law the confiscation proceedings at stake were civil proceedings. Consequently, EU law did not preclude such confiscations.

What is somewhat striking about this ruling is that at no point the CJEU seems to have asked the question whether those confiscation proceedings, classified as civil under Bulgarian law, were not in fact criminal in nature, with totally different consequences, as is indeed suggested by the recent case-law of the ECHR in the case of G.I.E.M. S.R.L. and Others v. Italy (28.6.2018), which concerned a similar problem, i.e. confiscation measures applied without prior formal conviction for unlawful site developments.

In the latter case, rather than the formal approach based on domestic classifications, followed by the CJEU, a Grand Chamber of the ECHR went for a substantive approach guided by an autonomous interpretation of the relevant notions. Applying Article 7 of the Convention, which precludes the imposition of a penalty without a prior formal declaration of liability, the ECHR had to determine whether the impugned confiscations amounted to such a penalty. It thereby ruled that the domestic characterisation of confiscation measures or proceedings was, as such, not decisive in determining whether they were criminal or not. Rather, other criteria, such as the nature and purpose of such measures as well as their severity had also to be taken into account. The ECHR stated in particular:

The Court concludes that the impugned confiscation measures can be regarded as “penalties” within the meaning of Article 7 of the Convention. This conclusion, which is the result of the autonomous interpretation of the notion of “penalty” within the meaning of Article 7, entails the applicability of that provision, even in the absence of criminal proceedings within the meaning of Article 6. Nevertheless, … it does not rule out the possibility for the domestic authorities to impose “penalties” through procedures other than those classified as criminal under domestic law. (§ 233)

Consequently, such confiscation measures being criminal in nature, despite their different characterisation under domestic law, they could not have been lawfully ordered without a prior formal declaration of liability. This could also have been the answer under Convention law to the question asked by the referring court in the present case before the CJEU.

Had the CJEU adopted a similar, more substantive approach in determining the notion and scope of civil and/or criminal proceedings for the purpose of the FD, it could have extended the scope of the FD so as to cover the “civil” confiscations at stake, thereby allowing the safeguards relating to the protection of fundamental rights (Art. 4 and 5 of the FD) to apply in the present case. Instead, it would appear that in a case like this, only the Convention can help.

TX and UW

In the case of TX and UW (13.2.2020) the CJEU, applying Directive 2016/343 on the presumption of innocence and the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings, relied on the case-law of the ECHR in determing the content of the right of the accused to be present at the trial, noting that this right was based on Article 6 of the Convention which corresponded to Article 47 (2) and (3) and Article 48 of the EU-Charter (§§ 35-37).

N.D. and N.T. v. Spain

In the case of N.D. and N.T. v. Spain (13.2.2020) a Grand Chamber of the ECHR ruled inter alia that the two applicants, migrants from Mali and Côte d’Ivoire who had attempted to cross the fences of the Melilla enclave and had been immediately returned to Morocco by the Spanish border guards, had not been the victim of a collective expulsion prohibited by Article 4 of Protocol no. 4 to the Convention. A key element of the Court’s reasoning is the obligation on the States to make available genuine and effective access to means of legal entry to their territory. In stating that principle, the ECHR referred to the Schengen Borders Code and the EU Procedures Directive, in the following terms:

With regard to Contracting States like Spain whose borders coincide, at least partly, with external borders of the Schengen area, the effectiveness of Convention rights requires that these States make available genuine and effective access to means of legal entry, in particular border procedures for those who have arrived at the border. Those means should allow all persons who face persecution to submit an application for protection, based in particular on Article 3 of the Convention, under conditions which ensure that the application is processed in a manner consistent with the international norms, including the Convention. In the context of the present case the Court also refers to the approach reflected in the Schengen Borders Code. The implementation of Article 4(1) of the Code, which provides that external borders may be crossed only at border crossing points and during the fixed opening hours, presupposes the existence of a sufficient number of such crossing points. In the absence of appropriate arrangements, the resulting possibility for States to refuse entry to their territory is liable to render ineffective all the Convention provisions designed to protect individuals who face a genuine risk of persecution.

However, where such arrangements exist and secure the right to request protection under the Convention, and in particular Article 3, in a genuine and effective manner, the Convention does not prevent States, in the fulfilment of their obligation to control borders, from requiring applications for such protection to be submitted at the existing border crossing points (see also Article 6 of the EU Procedures Directive …). Consequently, they may refuse entry to their territory to aliens, including potential asylum-seekers, who have failed, without cogent reasons …, to comply with these arrangements by seeking to cross the border at a different location, especially, as happened in this case, by taking advantage of their large numbers and using force. (§§ 209-210)

Sanofi Pasteur v. France

In the case of Sanofi Pasteur v. France (13.2.2020) the ECHR recapitulated its case-law on the need for domestic courts which, under Article 267 TFEU, are in principle obliged to make a reference to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling, to give reasons when they reject an application to that effect by one of the parties to the proceedings. In the present case, it found that the French Court of cassation had breached Article 6 of the Convention by limiting its reasoning to finding that there was no need to call the CJEU.

Deutsche Umwelthilfe

In the case of Deutsche Umwelthilfe (19.12.2012) a Grand Chamber of the CJEU ruled on the question whether the right to an effective remedy (Art. 47(1) of the EU-Charter) required domestic courts to impose coercive detention on senior political representatives or senior officials of Bavaria on account of the persistent refusal of the Bavarian government to comply with an injunction granted by the Munich Administrative Court pursuant to Directive 2008/50 on ambient air quality and cleaner air for Europe.

In answering that question the CJEU recalled, interpreting Article 47 of the EU-Charter in the light of the case-law of the ECHR on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, that the right to an effective remedy would be illusory if a Member State’s legal system were to allow a final, binding judicial decision to remain ineffective to the detriment of one party (§ 36-37).

As, however, the right to an effective remedy is not absolute, it had to be weighed against the right to liberty (Art. 6 of the EU-Charter) which required, in accordance with the case-law of the ECHR on Article 5 of the Convention, the legal basis for a limitation on the right to liberty to be sufficiently accessible, precise and foreseeable in its application, in order to avoid all risks of arbitrariness (§§ 45-46).

Centraal Justitieel Incassobureau

In the case of Centraal Justitieel Incassobureau (5.12.2019) the CJEU interpreted Framework Decision 2005/214 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to financial penalties. Two issues of interest from a Convention perspective are worth mentioning in this connection.

First, while the CJEU stresses that according to the principle of mutual recognition Member States are, as a rule, obliged to recognise a decision requiring payment of a financial penalty which has been transmitted in compliance with the Framework Decision and that, therefore, the grounds for refusal to recognise or enforce such a decision, as listed in Article 7(1) and (2) of the Framework Decision, must be interpreted restrictively (§ 30), it states at the same time:

It must be noted that, in accordance with Article 3 of the Framework Decision, that decision may not have the effect of amending the obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 TEU, which is why Article 20(3) of the Framework Decision also provides that the competent authority of the Member State of execution may refuse to recognise and execute a decision requiring payment of a financial penalty in the event of infringement of fundamental rights or fundamental legal principles defined by Article 6 of the Treaty. (§ 37)

This reasoning bears obvious similarities to Aranyosi and Căldăraru (C 404/15 and C 659/15 PPU, 5.4.2016) which concerned the Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant (2002/584) and in which the CJEU also stated that over and beyond the exhaustive list of grounds for non-execution of a European arrest warrant, “as is stated in Article 1(3) thereof, the Framework Decision is not to have the effect of modifying the obligation to respect fundamental rights as enshrined in, inter alia, the Charter” (§ 83).

This requirement makes sense in light of the fact that mutual recognition itself can be made the subject of an application before the ECHR against the Member State which, for instance, enforced a financial penalty or executed a European arrest warrant (see e.g. Pirozzi v. Belgium, 21055/11, 17.4.2018, below, on this page).

Secondly, in light of this requirement to comply with fundamental rights the CJEU examined whether the presumption of liability underpinning the Netherlands Highway Code on the basis of which the financial penalty had been imposed in the present case was compatible with the presumption of innocence laid down in Article 48 of the EU-Charter. Referring to Article 52(3) of the EU-Charter, it thereby relied on the case-law of the ECHR relating to the presumption of innocence under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention (§§ 53-55).

Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary

In the case of Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary (21.11.2019), a Grand Chamber of the ECHR inter alia found that Hungary had failed to discharge its procedural obligation under Article 3 of the Convention to assess the risks of treatment contrary to that provision before removing the applicants, two asylum seekers from Bangladesh, from Hungary to Serbia. As the case had given rise to the application of EU law at national level, the Court made the following clarifications regarding the interplay between the Convention and EU law in this field.

Firstly, in response to the Hungarian Government who argued that the national authorities had acted in accordance with EU law, the Court recalled that even when applying EU law, the Contracting States remain bound by the obligations they freely entered into on acceding to the Convention. However, when two conditions are met – the absence of any margin of manoeuvre on the part of the domestic authorities and the deployment of the full potential of the supervisory mechanism provided for by European Union law – those obligations must be assessed in the light of the presumption of Convention conformity as established in the Court’s case-law. The State remained fully responsible under the Convention for all acts falling outside its strict international legal obligations. In the present case the relevant EU law consisted of directives which did not impose on Hungary an obligation to act as they did. The Hungarian authorities therefore exercised a discretion granted under EU law, and the impugned measures taken by them did not fall within Hungary’s strict international legal obligations. Accordingly, the presumption of equivalent protection by the legal system of the EU did not apply in this case and Hungary was fully responsible under the Convention for the impugned acts (§§ 96-97).

Secondly, on the concept of “safe third country” as relied on by the respondent Government, the Court noted that Articles 33, 38 and 43 of the EU Asylum procedures directive provided for a possibility to enact national legislation that allows, under certain conditions, to forego an examination of requests for international protection on the merits and to undertake instead an examination of admissibility, in the sense of the above-mentioned EU directive (in particular, on whether it can reasonably be assumed that another country would conduct the examination on the merits or provide protection). In that case, however, the expelling State had to make sure that the intermediary country’s asylum procedure afforded sufficient guarantees to avoid an asylum-seeker being removed, directly or indirectly, to his country of origin without a proper evaluation of the risks he faced from the standpoint of Article 3 of the Convention (§§ 132-133). Any presumption that a particular country is “safe”, if it has been relied upon in decisions concerning an individual asylum seeker, must be sufficiently supported at the outset by an analysis of the relevant conditions in that country and, in particular, of its asylum system (§ 152). This had not been done in the present case.

A.K.

In the case of A.K. (19.11.2019) the CJEU dealt with the issue of the independence of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Polish Supreme Court. In setting out the requirements to be fulfilled under EU law for a court to be independent and impartial, it relied on the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter (right to a fair trial), thereby pointing out that, by virtue of Art. 52(3) of the Charter, “the Court must … ensure that the interpretation which it gives to the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter safeguards a level of protection which does not fall below the level of protection established in Article 6 of the ECHR, as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights” (§ 118).

The CJEU then went on to give an overview of its own case-law on the independence and impartiality of courts (including C-216/18 PPU, Minister for Justice and Equality (Deficiencies in the system of justice) and C-619/18, Commission v. Poland (Independence of the Supreme Court)) and pointed out that its interpretation of article 47 of the Charter was borne out by the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (§ 126) which the CJEU then proceeded to describe in some detail.

One may just wonder why the CJEU did not mention that same Strasbourg case-law in its previous judgment in C-619/18 mentioned above, which deals with very similar issues.

Right to be forgotten I and II

In two landmark judgments dated 6.11.2019 the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht – hereinafter “GCC”) dealt with the “right to be forgotten” and thereby clarified the relationship between the fundamental rights of the national Constitution (Grundgesetz), the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights.

In the first judgment (“Right to be forgotten I”1 BvR 16/13) the GCC stated that in areas not fully regulated by EU law it was to be assumed that the EU legislature allowed for some variety also in the field of fundamental rights. In such areas, the GCC would therefore only apply the fundamental rights of the Constitution, even when the EU Charter also applied by virtue of its Article 51(1). It would do so on the basis of a presumption that the level of protection of the EU Charter is already included in the protection afforded by the fundamental rights of the Constitution (§ 55). This presumption, which could be rebutted on a case-by-case basis (§ 63), was rooted not least in the European Convention on Human Rights which is both binding on the EU member States and being relied upon by the TEU (Art. 6(3)) as well as by the Charter itself (Preamble and Art. 52(3) and 53) (§ 56-57). In this connection, the GCC highlighted the role of the European Convention on Human Rights, which was to ensure an overarching minimum pan-european protection as a basis underlying both the national and the EU protection of fundamental rights (§ 62).

The applicant in this case claimed a right to have newspaper articles on his criminal conviction dating back 30 years removed from online archives. The GCC considered that the facts of the case were not entirely regulated by the applicable EU law (Directive 94/46 on the protection of individuals with regard to the protection of personal data; now replaced by the GDPR, 2016/679) in that the latter left some discretion to the member States in applying the so-called media privilege laid down in Articles 9 of the Directive and 85 of the GDPR (§ 12). It thus solely applied the fundamental rights of the Constitution, thereby leaving open the question whether the EU Charter also applied to the facts of the case by virtue of its Article 51(1). At the same time, the GCC took the view that there was no reason to assume that the protection level of the EU Charter would not be respected by its judgment, since the latter relied on the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights which, by virtue of Article 52(3) of the Charter, was decisive in interpreting the Charter (§ 154).

By contrast, in the second judgment (“Right to be forgotten II”1 BvR 276/17) the GCC stated that in areas fully regulated by EU law only the EU fundamental rights were to be applied, provided they were sufficiently effective. Departing from its previous case-law, the GCC ruled in this context that it would henceforth assess itself compliance of domestic judgments with EU fundamental rights, including the EU Charter, and that it would do so in cooperation with the CJEU, pursuant to Article 267 TFEU (§ 68). The applicant in this case claimed a right to have a hyperlink to an unfavourable media report removed from the list of results provided by a search engine operator (Google). As, unlike in the first judgment (above), the facts of the case did not give rise to the application of the so-called media privilege, the GCC considered that the issue at stake was fully regulated by EU law (Directive 94/46 and the GDPR, as above) and that therefore only the EU fundamental rights, including the EU Charter, applied. It then went on to apply in particular Articles 7, 8 and 16 of the EU Charter, thereby referring to the case-law of the CJEU and, by virtue of Article 52(3) of the Charter, to that of the ECHR. Having regard to those two sets of case-law, the GCC concluded that in the absence of any unsettled issues concerning the interpretation of EU law, there was no need to make a preliminary reference to the CJEU under Article 267 TFEU (§ 137).

One of the striking features of those two judgments of the GCC is their detailed analysis of how the national Constitution, the EU Charter and the Convention interact in practice and of the consequences at domestic level of the substantive link established by Article 52(3) of the EU Charter between the latter and the Convention. It plays a role notably for the assessment of whether domestic protection levels match EU protection levels (Right to be forgotten I) and of whether a preliminary reference to the CJEU is called for (Right to be forgotten II).

Dumitru-Tudor Dorobantu

In the case of Dumitru-Tudor Dorobantu (15.10.2019), a Grand Chamber of the CJEU confirmed and specified its case-law on the execution of a European arrest warrant in the face of a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment, in this case a risk arising out of the conditions of detention in the issuing Member State. Relying on Article 52(3) of the EU-Charter, the CJEU confirmed the absolute nature of the prohibition of ill-treatment as it resulted from Article 4 of the EU-Charter, which corresponded to Article 3 of the Convention. Still on the basis of Article 52(3) of the EU-Charter, the CJEU referred to the Mursic-jurisprudence of the ECHR (20.10.2016) for the assessment of the level of severity of conditions of detention. Interestingly, in § 57 of its judgment the CJEU also relied on the Romeo Castaño-jurisprudence of the ECHR (see below), holding that under the Convention, the refusal by a Member State to execute a European arrest warrant by reason of a risk of ill-treatment in the issuing State had to be based on an up-to-date and detailed examination of the situation as it existed at the time of the decision not to execute the warrant. The CJEU thereby apparently ignored the fact that the Romeo Castaño-jurisprudence has so far only been applied by the ECHR in respect of criminal proceedings falling under the scope of Article 2 of the Convention, i.e. in the event of a homicide, which is not the case in Dorobantu.

Rayonna prokuratura Lom

In Rayonna prokuratura Lom (19.9.2019) the CJEU ruled on the scope of three of the directives on procedural rights in criminal proceedings, being Directive 2012/13 on the right to information, Directive 2013/48 on the right of access to a lawyer and Directive 2016/343 on the presumption of innocence and the right to be present at the trial.

As regards the directives on the right to information and on access to a lawyer, the CJEU stated that these Directives also apply to proceedings for the committal to a psychiatric hospital of a person who committed a criminal offence, provided that such a measure was justified not only on therapeutic grounds but also on safety grounds. The CJEU came to this conclusion by relying inter alia on the case-law of the ECHR on Article 5 of the Convention (right to liberty and security), which also covers deprivations of liberty resulting from psychiatric or medical care measures. After recalling that Art. 6 of the EU-Charter corresponded to Art. 5 of the Convention and therefore, by virtue of Art. 52(3) of the Charter, had to be interpreted having regard to that case-law of the ECHR, the CJEU concluded: “Accordingly, in the light of the right to liberty and security guaranteed by Article 6 of the Charter, Directives 2012/13 and 2013/48 cannot be interpreted as excluding from their scope judicial proceedings in which an order may be made for the committal to a psychiatric hospital of a person who, at the conclusion of earlier criminal proceedings, was found to be the perpetrator of acts constituting a criminal offence.” (§ 46)

Thus, through this new case-law the concept of “criminal proceedings” – and the fair-trial guarantees which go with it – are being extended, for the purpose of the said directives, to “proceedings for committal to a psychiatric hospital which, although they do not lead to a ‘sentence’ in the strict sense, nevertheless result in a measure involving a deprivation of liberty, provided that such a measure is justified not only on therapeutic grounds but also on safety grounds” (§ 41). Moreover, the court dealing with a request for such a committal must have the power to verify that the procedural rights covered by those directives were respected in proceedings prior to those before that court (§ 63).

In simple terms, the procedure for the committal to a psychiatric hospital with a “penal purpose” (§ 71) is being assimilated with standard criminal proceedings on the ground that both can lead to a deprivation of liberty coming under the scope of Articles 5 of the Convention and 6 of the Charter.

By contrast, the CJEU ruled in the same judgment that the Directive on the presumption of innocence – and indeed EU law as such – did not apply to a procedure for the committal to a psychiatric hospital which had a purely therapeutic purpose and was implemented independently of any criminal proceedings (§ 66).

As a result of this case-law, domestic authorities dealing with procedures for the committal to a psychiatric hospital which are governed by any of the above-mentioned directives will now have to combine the safeguards laid down in those directives with the requirements under Art. 5 of the Convention relating to the deprivation of liberty of persons of unsound mind, as they have been recapitulated by the ECHR in the cases of Stanev v. Bulgaria (17.1.2012) and Rooman v. Belgium (31.1.2019). While those requirements to some extent draw on the fair-trial guarantees laid down in Art. 6 of the Convention, they cover many more aspects of the committal than just the rights of the defence.

Finally, as regards the substance of the rights at stake in the present case, it is perhaps worth noting that in relation to the right to information in criminal proceedings as enshrined in Directive 2012/13, the CJEU ruled that the relevant information was to be provided “as soon as possible” and “at the latest, before [the persons concerned] are first officially questioned by the police” (§ 53). This would appear to be in slight contrast with the requirement flowing from Simeonovi v. Bulgaria (ECHR 12.5.2017) according to which this information is to be provided immediately (§ 119).

AH and Others

In AH and Others (5.9.2019) the CJEU applied Directive 2016/343 on the presumption of innocence and the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings to an agreement with the prosecution in which only one of the co-accused persons had recognized his guilt in exchange for a reduction in sentencing. In doing so, the CJEU considered inter alia:

“… it should be noted that the presumption of innocence is enshrined in Article 48 of the Charter, which corresponds to Article 6(2) and (3) of the ECHR, as is apparent from the explanations to the Charter. It follows, in accordance with Article 52(3) of the Charter, that it is necessary to take account of Article 6(2) and (3) of the ECHR for the purposes of interpreting Article 48 of the Charter, as a minimum threshold of protection…” (§ 41)

In light of the above, the CJEU then relied on the judgments of the ECHR in the cases of Karaman v. Germany (27.2.2014) and Navanyy and Ofitrov v. Russia (23.2.2016).

Gambino and Hyka

In Gambino and Hyka (29.7.2019) the CJEU, relying on Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter and, by virtue of Article 52(3) of the Charter, on the case-law of the ECHR on the right to a fair trial (Article 6 of the Convention), ruled that Articles 16 and 18 of Directive 2012/29/EU on the rights of victims of crime do not prevent the victim of a criminal offence from having to be heard a second time following a change in the composition of the bench, if one of the parties to the proceedings so wishes.

Funke Medien

In Funke Medien NRW GmbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland (29.7.2019) a Grand Chamber of the CJEU applied Directive 2001/29/EC (on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society) to a set of facts concerning the publication by a newspaper of certain documents “classified for restricted access” drawn up by the German Government and relating to the operation of the German army in Afghanistan. In examining the scope of the exceptions for the benefit of the press and the information of the public, provided for in Article 5 of the directive, the CJEU stated the need for a fair balance to be struck between the protection of intellectual property (Article 17(2) of the Charter) and the freedom of expression and information (Article 11 of the Charter). In this connection, the CJEU referred, by virtue of Article 52(3) of the Charter, to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights according to which, in balancing copyright against freedom of expression, due consideration was to be given to the nature of the expression or information at stake and in particular to the question whether it concerned matters of public interest. Given that the CJEU leaves it to the national courts to strike this balance which, at the end of the day, can be challenged by way of an application to the Strasbourg Court against the final domestic judgment, reliance by the CJEU on the Strasbourg case-law would appear to also serve the interests of domestic judges.

Mihalache v. Romania

In Mihalache v. Romania (8.7.2019) a Grand Chamber of the ECHR had to determine whether a public prosecutor’s order discontinuing criminal proceedings while imposing a fine on the applicant was a “final acquittal or conviction” triggering the application of the non bis in idem principle as laid down in Article 4 of Protocol No 7 to the Convention. In answering that question in the affirmative, the ECHR relied on a series of criteria (determination as to the merits, availability of ordinary remedies, expiry of the time-limit within which those remedies are to be used) which in substance coincide with those relied on by the CJEU in similar cases such as Piotr Kossowski v. Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Hamburg (C-486/14). Only when a penalty has been imposed does EU law depart from Article 4 of Protocol No 7 in that Article 54 of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement requires, as a condition for the application of the non bis in idem principle, that the penalty has been enforced, is in the process of being enforced or can no longer be enforced under the laws of the sentencing Member State (see Spasic, C-129/14).

Melvin West v. Hungary

In Melvin West v. Hungary (decision, 25.6.2019) the ECHR confirmed that Article 6 of the Convention does not apply to the procedure for the execution of a European Arrest warrant but that, by virtue of Article 5 § 1 f) of the Convention, any detention with a view to transferring the person concerned to the issuing Member State has to be in compliance with the relevant domestic and European Union law, which it is primarily for the national authorities to interpret. Moreover, Article 5 prohibits any transfer of a person to a country where he or she would be exposed to a real risk of a flagrant breach of this provision. Finally, the ECHR reiterated that there is no basis under Article 8 of the Convention for a convicted person to avoid having to serve a prison sentence in a foreign country.

Romeo Castaño v. Belgium

In Romeo Castaño v. Belgium (9.7.2019) the ECHR confirmed the applicability of Article 3 of the Convention to the execution by EU Member States of a European Arrest Warrant but extended its scrutiny to Article 2 of the Convention in cases where a European Arrest Warrant has been issued with a view to enabling criminal proceedings for homicide in the issuing State to go ahead. In such cases, Article 2 imposes on the executing State an obligation to cooperate with the issuing State in facilitating those criminal proceedings, notably by transferring the person who is the subject of the European Arrest Warrant, without however ignoring the limits to such a transfer flowing from Article 3 of the Convention. Any refusal of a transfer on this ground should therefore be duly reasoned by reference to updated and individualised information.

Nodet v. France

In Nodet v. France (6.6.2019) the ECHR applied the non bis in idem principle according to its recent A. & B. v. Norway jurisprudence (24130/11 and 29758/11, 15.11.2016), which is in some contrast with the Menci jurisprudence of the CJEU (C-524/15, 20.3.2018), also mentioned in the Nodet judgment (at § 31).

O.C.I. and Others v. Romania

The case of O.C.I. and Others v. Romania concerned decisions by the Romanian courts acting under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction and the Brussels II bis Regulation (No. 2201/2003) and ordering the return to Italy of two children who had been abducted to Romania by their mother because their Italian father had allegedly used violence against them. In its judgment of 21.5.2019, the ECHR found a violation of Article 8 of the Convention (right to respect for family life) on account of the fact that the domestic courts should have given more consideration to the potential risk of ill-treatment for the children if they were returned to Italy. After reiterating that a child’s return cannot be ordered automatically or mechanically (§§ 35 and 46), the ECHR held in particular:

In the context of an application for return, which is distinct from custody proceedings, it is primarily for the national authorities of the requested State, which have, inter alia, the benefit of direct contact with the interested parties, to establish the best interests of the child and evaluate the case in the light of the exceptions provided for by the Hague Convention. (§ 40) …

As member States of the European Union, both States are parties to the Brussels II bis Regulation, which is thus applicable in the case (see K.J. v. Poland, cited above, § 58). That Regulation, which builds on the Hague Convention, is based on the principle of mutual trust between EU member States (see Royer v. Hungary, no. 9114/16, § 50, 6 March 2018). However, in the Court’s view, the existence of mutual trust between child-protection authorities does not mean that the State to which children have been wrongfully removed is obliged to send them back to an environment where they will incur a grave risk of domestic violence solely because the authorities in the State in which the child had its habitual residence are capable of dealing with cases of domestic child abuse. Nothing in the Hague Convention or in the Brussels II bis Regulation allows the Court to reach a different conclusion. (§ 45)

This approach would appear to be in some contrast with the one followed by the CJEU, notably in the Povse case (C-211/10).

Repcevirag Szövetkezet v. Hungary

In Repcevirag Szövetkezet v. Hungary (30.4.2019) the ECHR examined whether the Kúria breached Article 6 of the Convention by refusing to request a preliminary ruling by the CJEU in proceedings relating to an action in tort against Hungary for infringement of European Union law (Köbler case-law).

Baltic Master Ltd. v. Lithuania

In Baltic Master Ltd. v. Lithuania (16.4.2019) the ECHR found a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on the ground that the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania had not made sufficiently clear in its judgment on what specific legal grounds it had considered the application of EU law to be so obvious that no referral to the CJEU was required under Article 267 TFEU, despite the applicant company’s request to that effect. What is also noteworthy about this judgment is that it was given by a Committee of three judges acting under Article 28 § 1 b) of the Convention, the outcome of this case being considered to flow from well-established case-law within the meaning of that provision.

Harisch v. Germany

In Harisch v. Germany (11.4.2019) the ECHR assessed compliance with Article 6 of the Convention of the failure by the Federal Court of Justice (BGH), in the context of its examination of a refusal of leave to appeal, to give reasons for its refusal to request a preliminary ruling from the CJEU (Art. 267 TFEU).

Jawo v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland

In Jawo v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland (C-163/17,19.3.2019) the CJEU inter alia further specified the impact of Article 4 of the EU-Charter on the execution of the Dublin Regulation and drew on the M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece judgment of the ECHR. It also described the relationship between systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure of a Member State and the requirement of an individual assessment of the situation of asylum seekers.

TC

In TC (12.2.2019) the CJEU examined in light of Article 6 of the EU-Charter and 5 of the Convention whether the time limits for adoption of the decision to execute a European Arrest Warrant can be suspended.

Pirozzi v. Belgium

In Pirozzi v. Belgium (17.4.2018) the ECHR applied the Avotiņš-jurisprudence to the execution of a European Arrest Warrant. In this jurisprudence (Avotiņš v. Latvia, 23.5.2016) the ECHR set out its approach to the mutual recognition mechanisms established under EU law.

Thimothawes v. Belgium

In Thimothawes v. Belgium (4.4.2017) the ECHR explained the impact of EU law when assessing compliance with Article 5 of the Convention of a detention ordered by virtue of domestic law transposing the Reception Directive.