In the case of FMS and Others (C-924/19 PPU and C-925/19 PPU, 14.5.2020), the CJEU ruled on several aspects of the situation of asylum seekers in the Röszke transit zone, which is located on Hungarian territory, at the border with Serbia. One of the findings by the CJEU is that the accommodation in this transit zone amounts to a de facto detention of asylum seekers (§ 231). Yet, in the case of Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary (see on this page, the post on this case), the ECHR found the same living conditions experienced by the applicants in the same transit zone not to have amounted to a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Article 5 of the Convention, with the consequence that this provision was declared inapplicable.

Does it follow from this that EU law better protects asylum seekers from detention in transit zones? Not necessarily. The qualification as detention of the accommodation in a transit zone is indeed a pre-condition for the start of the four weeks deadline set by Article 43(2) of the Procedures Directive as the maximum length of detention of asylum seekers in such a zone. This means, in practical terms, that a detention of up to four weeks is in principle acceptable under EU law, regardless of individual circumstances.

By contrast, even if Article 5 of the Convention does not in principle apply from the very beginning of a stay in a transit zone such as Röszke, at the border of two States, this can change any time in view of individual circumstances, i.e. from the moment when restrictions to the liberty of movement of asylum seekers exceed what is strictly necessary for the processing of their asylum applications (see § 233 of the Ilias and Ahmed judgment). There is no reason why this could not occur before the expiry of a four weeks period, with the consequence that Article 5 would then most likely also be breached and require an immediate lifting of the impugned restrictions (see, mutatis mutandis, CEDH 23.2.2012, Creanga v. Romania, 29226/03, §§ 97 and 100).

Thus, this comparison clearly demonstrates the methodological differences between the two systems. While EU law operates on the basis of an abstract deadline of four weeks to be triggered by the finding of the existence of a detention from the beginning of the stay concerned, Article 5 of the Convention allows for a case-by-case assessment of the living conditions in transit zones and an “activation” of the ban on arbitrary detentions from the moment when those conditions exceed what is strictly necessary in the circumstances.

Consequently, domestic courts of EU Member States should not confine themselves to examining such situations under only one of the legal systems concerned. For depending on the circumstances, either of them can provide the higher protection against unlawful detention of asylum seekers. In such a situation, domestic courts of EU Member States are indeed bound to apply the higher protection (Article 52(3) of the EU-Charter).

The case of Bevándorlási és Menekültügyi Hivatal, adjudicated by the CJEU on 19 March 2020, is very similar to the case of Ahmed and Ilias v. Hungary (see below, on this page) which was decided a few months earlier, on 21 November 2019, by the ECHR. In both cases the main issue was the way Hungarian courts had made use of the possibility, provided for by article 33.2 (c) of the Procedures Directive, to declare a request for international protection inadmissible on the ground that a country which is not a Member State is considered as a safe third country for the applicant.

The CJEU found the domestic legislation not to have adequately transposed the Directive by omitting to incorporate some of its basic requirements, including the principle of non-refoulement. It thereby came, in substance, much to the same conclusion as the ECHR, which for its part had found, inter alia, Hungarian courts to have breached the procedural obligations flowing from Article 3 of the Convention.

Interestingly, however, and in contrast with the ECHR ruling, the CJEU elaborated on the requirement, for a third country to be able to be considered safe, that there be a connection between the applicant and the third country concerned on the basis of which it would be reasonable for that person to go to that country (Art. 38.2 (a) of the Directive). In its opinion, the mere fact of transiting through a specific country could not be considered as amounting to such a connection.

No such requirement flows from the Convention. In this respect, EU law would appear to offer a higher protection standard. This, however, is in line with Article 53 of the Convention, which allows States to exceed the minimum Convention protection standard, including on the basis of EU law (see, on this latter aspect, mutatis mutandis, M.N. v. Belgium (dec.), no. 3599/18, 5.5.2020, § 140).

In the case of AGRO IN 2001, a Bulgarian judge asked the CJEU whether under EU law he could lawfully order the confiscation of the assets of persons on account of criminal offences – embezzling of funds – the same persons had been charged with in criminal proceedings which were still pending. The CJEU ruled that the relevant legal instrument, Framework Decision 2005/212 on the confiscation of crime-related proceeds, instrumentalities and property (“the FD”), was not applicable in the present case, since the scope of the FD was limited to criminal proceedings, whereas under Bulgarian law the confiscation proceedings at stake were civil proceedings. Consequently, EU law did not preclude such confiscations.

What is somewhat striking about this ruling is that at no point the CJEU seems to have asked the question whether those confiscation proceedings, classified as civil under Bulgarian law, were not in fact criminal in nature, with totally different consequences, as is indeed suggested by the recent case-law of the ECHR in the case of G.I.E.M. S.R.L. and Others v. Italy (28.6.2018), which concerned a similar problem, i.e. confiscation measures applied without prior formal conviction for unlawful site developments.

In the latter case, rather than the formal approach based on domestic classifications, followed by the CJEU, a Grand Chamber of the ECHR went for a substantive approach guided by an autonomous interpretation of the relevant notions. Applying Article 7 of the Convention, which precludes the imposition of a penalty without a prior formal declaration of liability, the ECHR had to determine whether the impugned confiscations amounted to such a penalty. It thereby ruled that the domestic characterisation of confiscation measures or proceedings was, as such, not decisive in determining whether they were criminal or not. Rather, other criteria, such as the nature and purpose of such measures as well as their severity had also to be taken into account. The ECHR stated in particular:

The Court concludes that the impugned confiscation measures can be regarded as “penalties” within the meaning of Article 7 of the Convention. This conclusion, which is the result of the autonomous interpretation of the notion of “penalty” within the meaning of Article 7, entails the applicability of that provision, even in the absence of criminal proceedings within the meaning of Article 6. Nevertheless, … it does not rule out the possibility for the domestic authorities to impose “penalties” through procedures other than those classified as criminal under domestic law. (§ 233)

Consequently, such confiscation measures being criminal in nature, despite their different characterisation under domestic law, they could not have been lawfully ordered without a prior formal declaration of liability. This could also have been the answer under Convention law to the question asked by the referring court in the present case before the CJEU.

Had the CJEU adopted a similar, more substantive approach in determining the notion and scope of civil and/or criminal proceedings for the purpose of the FD, it could have extended the scope of the FD so as to cover the “civil” confiscations at stake, thereby allowing the safeguards relating to the protection of fundamental rights (Art. 4 and 5 of the FD) to apply in the present case. Instead, it would appear that in a case like this, only the Convention can help.

In the case of Deutsche Umwelthilfe (19.12.2019) a Grand Chamber of the CJEU ruled on the question whether the right to an effective remedy (Art. 47(1) of the EU-Charter) required domestic courts to impose coercive detention on senior political representatives or senior officials of Bavaria on account of the persistent refusal of the Bavarian government to comply with an injunction granted by the Munich Administrative Court pursuant to Directive 2008/50 on ambient air quality and cleaner air for Europe.

In answering that question the CJEU recalled, interpreting Article 47 of the EU-Charter in the light of the case-law of the ECHR on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, that the right to an effective remedy would be illusory if a Member State’s legal system were to allow a final, binding judicial decision to remain ineffective to the detriment of one party (§ 36-37). As, however, the right to an effective remedy is not absolute, it had to be weighed against the right to liberty (Art. 6 of the EU-Charter) which required, in accordance with the case-law of the ECHR on Article 5 of the Convention, the legal basis for a limitation on the right to liberty to be sufficiently accessible, precise and foreseeable in its application, in order to avoid all risks of arbitrariness (§§ 45-46).

In the case of Centraal Justitieel Incassobureau (5.12.2019) the CJEU interpreted Framework Decision 2005/214 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to financial penalties. Two issues of interest from a Convention perspective are worth mentioning in this connection.

First, while the CJEU stresses that according to the principle of mutual recognition Member States are, as a rule, obliged to recognise a decision requiring payment of a financial penalty which has been transmitted in compliance with the Framework Decision and that, therefore, the grounds for refusal to recognise or enforce such a decision, as listed in Article 7(1) and (2) of the Framework Decision, must be interpreted restrictively (§ 30), it states at the same time:

It must be noted that, in accordance with Article 3 of the Framework Decision, that decision may not have the effect of amending the obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 TEU, which is why Article 20(3) of the Framework Decision also provides that the competent authority of the Member State of execution may refuse to recognise and execute a decision requiring payment of a financial penalty in the event of infringement of fundamental rights or fundamental legal principles defined by Article 6 of the Treaty. (§ 37)

This reasoning bears obvious similarities to Aranyosi and Căldăraru (C 404/15 and C 659/15 PPU, 5.4.2016) which concerned the Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant (2002/584) and in which the CJEU also stated that over and beyond the exhaustive list of grounds for non-execution of a European arrest warrant, “as is stated in Article 1(3) thereof, the Framework Decision is not to have the effect of modifying the obligation to respect fundamental rights as enshrined in, inter alia, the Charter” (§ 83).

This requirement makes sense in light of the fact that mutual recognition itself can be made the subject of an application before the ECHR against the Member State which, for instance, enforced a financial penalty or executed a European arrest warrant (see e.g. Pirozzi v. Belgium, 21055/11, 17.4.2018, mentioned on the “Recent case-law” page).

Secondly, in light of this requirement to comply with fundamental rights the CJEU examined whether the presumption of liability underpinning the Netherlands Highway Code on the basis of which the financial penalty had been imposed in the present case was compatible with the presumption of innocence laid down in Article 48 of the EU-Charter. Referring to Article 52(3) of the EU-Charter, it thereby relied on the case-law of the ECHR relating to the presumption of innocence under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention (§§ 53-55).

In the case of A.K. and Others (19.11.2019) the CJEU dealt with the issue of the independence of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Polish Supreme Court. In setting out the requirements to be fulfilled under EU law for a court to be independent and impartial, it relied on the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter (right to a fair trial), thereby pointing out that, by virtue of Art. 52(3) of the Charter, “the Court must … ensure that the interpretation which it gives to the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter safeguards a level of protection which does not fall below the level of protection established in Article 6 of the ECHR, as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights” (§ 118).

The CJEU then went on to give an overview of its own case-law on the independence and impartiality of courts (including C-216/18 PPU, Minister for Justice and Equality (Deficiencies in the system of justice) and C-619/18, Commission v. Poland (Independence of the Supreme Court)) and pointed out that its interpretation of article 47 of the Charter was borne out by the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (§ 126) which the CJEU then proceeded to describe in some detail.

One may just wonder why the CJEU did not mention that same Strasbourg case-law in its previous judgment in C-619/18 mentioned above, which deals with very similar issues.

In Rayonna prokuratura Lom (19.9.2019) the CJEU ruled on the scope of three of the directives on procedural rights in criminal proceedings, being Directive 2012/13 on the right to information, Directive 2013/48 on the right of access to a lawyer and Directive 2016/343 on the presumption of innocence and the right to be present at the trial.

As regards the directives on the right to information and on access to a lawyer, the CJEU stated that these Directives also apply to proceedings for the committal to a psychiatric hospital of a person who committed a criminal offence, provided that such a measure was justified not only on therapeutic grounds but also on safety grounds. The CJEU came to this conclusion by relying inter alia on the case-law of the ECHR on Article 5 of the Convention (right to liberty and security), which also covers deprivations of liberty resulting from psychiatric or medical care measures. After recalling that Art. 6 of the EU-Charter corresponded to Art. 5 of the Convention and therefore, by virtue of Art. 52(3) of the Charter, had to be interpreted having regard to that case-law of the ECHR, the CJEU concluded: “Accordingly, in the light of the right to liberty and security guaranteed by Article 6 of the Charter, Directives 2012/13 and 2013/48 cannot be interpreted as excluding from their scope judicial proceedings in which an order may be made for the committal to a psychiatric hospital of a person who, at the conclusion of earlier criminal proceedings, was found to be the perpetrator of acts constituting a criminal offence.” (§ 46)

Thus, through this new case-law the concept of “criminal proceedings” – and the fair-trial guarantees which go with it – are being extended, for the purpose of the said directives, to “proceedings for committal to a psychiatric hospital which, although they do not lead to a ‘sentence’ in the strict sense, nevertheless result in a measure involving a deprivation of liberty, provided that such a measure is justified not only on therapeutic grounds but also on safety grounds” (§ 41). Moreover, the court dealing with a request for such a committal must have the power to verify that the procedural rights covered by those directives were respected in proceedings prior to those before that court (§ 63).

In simple terms, the procedure for the committal to a psychiatric hospital with a “penal purpose” (§ 71) is being assimilated with standard criminal proceedings on the ground that both can lead to a deprivation of liberty coming under the scope of Articles 5 of the Convention and 6 of the Charter.

By contrast, the CJEU ruled in the same judgment that the Directive on the presumption of innocence – and indeed EU law as such – did not apply to a procedure for the committal to a psychiatric hospital which had a purely therapeutic purpose and was implemented independently of any criminal proceedings (§ 66).

As a result of this case-law, domestic authorities dealing with procedures for the committal to a psychiatric hospital which are governed by any of the above-mentioned directives will now have to combine the safeguards laid down in those directives with the requirements under Art. 5 of the Convention relating to the deprivation of liberty of persons of unsound mind, as they have been recapitulated by the ECHR in the cases of Stanev v. Bulgaria (17.1.2012) and Rooman v. Belgium (31.1.2019). While those requirements to some extent draw on the fair-trial guarantees laid down in Art. 6 of the Convention, they cover many more aspects of the committal than just the rights of the defence.

Finally, as regards the substance of the rights at stake in the present case, it is perhaps worth noting that in relation to the right to information in criminal proceedings as enshrined in Directive 2012/13, the CJEU ruled that the relevant information was to be provided “as soon as possible” and “at the latest, before [the persons concerned] are first officially questioned by the police” (§ 53). This would appear to be in slight contrast with the requirement flowing from Simeonovi v. Bulgaria (ECHR 12.5.2017) according to which this information is to be provided immediately (§ 119).