In the case of Ferrero Quintana v. Spain (2669/19, 26.11.2024), the ECtHR ruled on whether the applicant had been the victim of age discrimination, contrary to Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 to the Convention, as a result of the imposition of a maximum age limit of 35 years in a public competition aimed at filling several police officer positions within the police force (Ertzaintza) of the Basque Autonomous Community.

After a careful analysis of all the circumstances and having regard to the wide margin of appreciation of the national authorities, the ECtHR unanimously found no violation of that provision, because the impugned difference in treatment pursued a legitimate aim and was not disproportionate.

Interestingly, the CJEU had come earlier to a very similar conclusion in Salaberria Sorondo, a case initiated by another candidate in the same competition, but on the basis of Directive 2000/78 of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation, notably its Article 4(1) which provides that “ … Member States may provide that a difference of treatment which is based on a characteristic related to any of the grounds referred to in Article 1 shall not constitute discrimination where, by reason of the nature of the particular occupational activities concerned or of the context in which they are carried out, such a characteristic constitutes a genuine and determining occupational requirement, provided that the objective is legitimate and the requirement is proportionate.”

This ruling by the CJEU is abundantly quoted by the ECtHR in its statement of the relevant domestic and international legal sources. While only sparely referring explicitly to these quotes in its reasoning, the ECtHR, by developing very similar arguments, but following its own methodology, clearly drew a lot of inspiration from that Luxembourg ruling.

This case is therefore another interesting illustration of the substantial and procedural interaction between the Luxembourg and Strasbourg protection of fundamental rights, in spite of methodological differences.

There is substantial interaction when cross-fertilisation is taking place between the Strasbourg and Luxembourg jurisprudence, despite the sometimes different legal provisions and methodologies being applied by each of the European Courts, as in the present case.

There is procedural interaction when, as in the case at hand, the same issues come, at different stages of the proceedings, before both European Courts, with the ECtHR coming last, as was also the case, mutatis mutandis, in Centraal Israëlitisch Consistorie van België and Others.

In Centraal Israëlitisch Consistorie van België and Others, however, the CJEU in giving its ruling had amply relied on the Strasbourg case-law on freedom of religion, which prompted the ECtHR, as it explicitly admitted, to exercise, for the sake of upholding subsidiarity and case-law harmony, some “self-restraint” as regards the Luxembourg approach. By not doing so in Salaberria Sorondo, the CJEU took a greater risk of not being followed by the ECtHR, with possible consequences for national judges and citizens.